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THE E-2 TREATY INVESTOR VISA:
THE CURRENT LAW AND THE PROPOSED
REGULATIONS
Catherine Sun'
INTRODUCTION
For foreign investors who do not have one million dollars to ex-
change for a "green card,"' many immigration practitioners regard the
E-2 treaty investor visa2 as "the next best thing to permanent resident
status."3 With an investment of less than $50,000," and for as long as
* J.D., 1997, American University, Washington College of Law;, B.A., George
Mason University. The author thanks the following for their assistance in the prepara-
tion of this Comment Professor Michael Maggio, Mr. Cornelius D. Scully, Mr. H.
Edward Odom, and the staff of the American University Journal of International Law
and Policy.
1. See generally Elliott Fertik, Comment, Reforming the Immigrant Investor
Program of the Immigration Act of 1990, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 649 (1995)
(examining the failure of the immigrant investor visa that is available to immigrants
who invest at least $1 million in a new business that creates at least ten full-time
jobs). If the foreign investor invests $500,000 in a rural area or in an area with a
high unemployment rate, the investor remains eligible for an EB-5 visa. Id. at 655;
see Palma R. Yanni, Business Investors: E-2 Nonimmigrants and EB-5 Immigrants,
IMMIGR BREFINGS, Aug. 1992, at 18-27 (discussing the immigrant investor visa and
its historical foundation).
2. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(15)(E)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(E)(ii).
3. Manfred Rosenow, How Foreigners Can Work Temporarily in This Country,
MLAhi HERALD, May 20, 1991, at 13BM; see I CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IhMMIGRA-
TION LAW AND PROCEDuRE § 17.01 (1994) (stating that the E visa, a nonimmigrant
visa, most similarly parallels an immigrant visa); David Grunblatt et aL., The U.S.
Nonimmigrant Visa System, in BASIC IMMIGRATION LAW 1992, at 81 (PLI Litig. &
Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 433, 1992) (noting that the benefits ac-
corded to an E visaholder are as essentially equivalent to those rights held by a
permanent resident).
4. See In re Walsh & Pollard, Interim Dec. No. 3111, 1988 BIA LEXIS 55, at
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the E-2 investor maintains an E-2 status, the treaty investor can enjoy
the benefit of an indefimite duration of stay in the United States and the
ability to engage in the investment, as well as other incidental activi-
ties.5
The steady increase in international investments and in the number of
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) signed in the past decade makes the
E-2 treaty investor visa one of the more popular nonimmigrant visas,6
particularly with the "upper echelon of [the] international business soci-
ety."7 In contrast to the immigrant investor visa (EB-5), s the number of
E-2 visas issued remains high.9
The E-2 visa brings tremendous benefits to the United States because
it encourages foreign investors to contribute substantially to the United
States economy through capital infusion and job creation."0 In addition,
it allows expansion of the United States economy to many developing
treaty nations." Unfortunately, the State Department and the Depart-
*136 (1988) (holding that a $20,000 investment in an engineering design service con-
stituted a substantial investment, permitting the principal treaty investor to qualify his
employees).
5. GORDON Er AL., supra note 3, § 17.01; Manfred Rosenow, $1 Million In-
vestment Can Lead to Citizenship, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 22, 1991, at 14BM (discuss-
ing the benefits of the treaty investor visa).
6. See Yanni, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that the number of E-2 visas issued
has nearly doubled from 1987 to 1991); see also U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE FOREIGN
AFFAIRS MANUAL: PART II - NONIMMIGRANT VISAS, No. 9, 22 C.F.R. § 41.51, note
1, reprinted in IMMIGR. L. SERV. (CBC) 81 (June 1994) [hereinafter FAM] (reporting
on the increasing popularity of the E visa).
7. Grunblatt et al., supra note 3, at 404.
8. INA § 203(b)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5) (1990) (added by Immigration Act of
1990 § 121). The number of applications received and the number of immigrant in-
vestor visas issued remain extremely low compared to the 10,000 visas available for
immigrant investors. Id.; see Fertik, supra note 1, at 650 (stating that of the 725
applications submitted in the first two years, the INS approved only 296).
9. See Yanni, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that the number of E-2 visas issued
has steadily increased from 11,812 in 1987, to 20,584 in 1991). Nationals of Japan,
the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Korea, and Taiwan receive a majority of the
E-2 visas. Id. Citizens of Japan, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Germany
received more than 80% of the E-2 visas issued in 1990. Id.; see AUSTIN T.
FRAGOMEN Er AL., IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES HANDBOOK § 3.2(a) (1995) (stating
that Japanese nationals account for nearly half of the issued E visas).
10. Cf. FAM, supra note 6, at 85-86, notes 9-10 (defining substantial investment
by the value of the business investment and permitting proof of job creation as proof
of non-marginality).
11. Interview with Cornelius D. Scully, Director of the Office of Legislation,
Regulations, and Advisory Assistance, State Department Visa Office, and H. Edward
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ment of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) proposed
regulations, 2 now pending for more than four years, may limit the use
and benefits of the E-2 visa substantially. 3
This Comment analyzes the statute, regulations, and agency guidelines
governing the E-2 treaty investor visa. Part I recounts the background of
the E-2 visa. Part II analyzes the current law on the E-2 classification.
Part III compares and contrasts the two long-pending versions of the
proposed rules with the present E-2 regulations and guidelines. Part IV
presents recommendations for the final regulations. Finally, this Com-
ment concludes that the language of the proposed rules will discourage
many eligible foreign investors from making bona fide investments and
contributions in the United States. More importantly, treaty nations could
counter-impose similarly strict requirements on United States investors
abroad, impeding United States international economic expansion. This
Comment urges adherence to the purpose and intent of the visa classifi-
cation and the BITs which are to retain flexibility in visa requirements
and adjudications in order to draw foreign investments to the United
States and to facilitate and protect United States investments abroad.
I. BACKGROUND
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND AGENCY AUTHORITY
The esteem and special privileges that today's E-2 treaty investors
hold originated in the late 1800s'" from the favored status of the treaty
Odom, Chief of the Advisory Opinions Division, State Department Visa Office, in
Washington, D.C. (Sept 28, 1995) (stating that the treaty investors, in individual or
corporate capacities, have made "very significant and major contributions to local
employment and to the United States economy").
12. Nonimmigrant Classes; Treaty Aliens E Classification, 56 Fed. Reg. 42,952
(1991) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pL 214) (proposed Aug. 30, 1991) (hereinafter INS
Proposal] (proposing the codification of existing policy guidelines); Visas: Documenta-
tion of Nonimmigrants Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 56 Fed. Reg.
43,565 (1991) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. pt. 41) (proposed Sept. 3. 1991) [hereinaf-
ter DOS Proposal] (proposing the promulgation of interpretative note material in the
State Department's Foreign Affairs Manual).
13. See infra note 220 and accompanying text (discussing the concern that the
more stringent proposed regulations may restrict the utility of the E-2 visa).
14. See Yanni, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that while the restrictive immigration
law of the late nineteenth century did not apply to treaty merchants, nor prevent the
United States from granting admission to treaty merchants, this same law denied ad-
mission to other citizens); see also GORDON ET AL, supra note 3. § 17.02 (providing
a discussion on the admission status of Chinese merchants).
1996]
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merchants, 5 later known as treaty traders. 6  Historically, the Ameri-
can door is open to merchants who desire to conduct trade in the United
States temporarily. 7
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1924 created the treaty
trader (E-1) class. 8 With the increase in international investment, the
1952 INA expanded the E-1 treaty trader class to create the E-2 treaty
investor class 9 in order to promote the goals of increasing international
investments and attracting foreign investments to the United States.2"
15. See Yanni, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that in the late nineteenth century, the
United States desire for international trade resulted in the exemption of foreign mer-
chant traders from the restrictive United States immigration laws); GORDON ET AL..,
supra note 3, § 17.02 (discussing that despite formal Chinese Exclusion Laws, the
Chinese merchant qualified for entry as one of the few protected categories under the
1880 Treaty between the United States and China).
16. GORDON ET AL., supra note 3, § 17.02.
17. See id. § 17.02 (stating that the 1924 Act did not subject the treaty merchant
to numerical limitations because the treaty merchant did not qualify under the Act's
definition of an "immigrant"); Yanni, supra note 1, at 2 (remarking that "the 1990
Act continued and expanded a long tradition of admitting foreigners for the purpose
of pursuing investments in the U.S.").
18. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(15)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1101
(a)(15)(E) (1924); GORDON ET AL., supra note 3, § 17.02.
19. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(15)(E)(ii), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15)(E)(ii)(1952); H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1952). The
legislative history declares that E-2 classification provides that aliens may enter the
country temporarily to participate in "developing or directing the operations of a real
operating enterprise and not a fictitious paper operation." Id.
20. See Richard S. Goldstein, Non-Immigrant Treaty Trader and Treaty Investor
Classification: Current Developments and Trends, in A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY
IMMIGRATION LAW, No. C394, at 109, 134 (1989) (stating that the purpose of the
E-1 visa is to facilitate transnational trade); see also Mark A. Ivener, Regulations and
Case Studies in Representing E-1 Treaty Traders, and E-2 Treaty Investors, in 25TH
ANNUAL IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION INSTrTrrE 452 (PLI Litig. & Admin.
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 355, 1992) (stating that the E-1 and E-2 visas
mean to stimulate the United States economy by creating employment opportunities
and investment operations, and by infusing new capital into the United States).
A nonimmigrant E-2 visaholder, is defined as:
an alien entitled to enter the United States under and in pursuance of the pro-
visions of a treaty of commerce and navigation between the United States and
the foreign state of which he is a national, and the spouse and children of any
such alien if accompanying or following to join him . . . solely to develop and
direct the operations of an enterprise in which he has invested, or of an enter-
prise in which he is actively in the process of investing, a substantial amount
of capital.
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In the interpretation and adjudication of the E-2 visas, the statute
itself provides very limited guidance.2' The State Department and the
INS both have authority to draft rules and guidelines for the E-2 classi-
fication.' The State Department, however, retains the primary authority
over E-2 matters because it holds the sole responsibility to negotiate and
interpret treaties and agreements that provide the basis for granting E-2
visas.' In particular, practitioners refer to the State Department's For-
Immigration Act of 1990 (IA), Pub. L. No. 101-649, 121, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101); see INA § 101(a)(15)(E)(ii) (1990) (defining the E
visa with the same language).
21. See Nice v. Turnage, 752 F.2d 431, 432 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting Kun Young
Kim v. INS, 586 F.2d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1978)) (asserting that the legislative history
provides "little assistance" in setting forth requirements for E-2 visas); see also
Howard S. Myers III & Elizabeth A. Thompson, A Practitioner's Guide to Business
Visas: Part 1, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, June 1988, at 9 (stating that "[m]any of the [E-2
definitional] components are not statutory but created by implementing regulations,
operations manuals, or policy memoranda"); Charles M. Miller, United States Immigra-
tion Planning for Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisition, 27 SAN DIFO L REV. 831,
833 (1970) (characterizing the statute as a "basic framework of requirements that
defines the treaty investor classification").
22. INA §§ 103-104 (setting forth the responsibilities of the two agencies); see
22 C.F.R. § 41.51 (1994) (providing the State Department with the authority to issue
regulations on E visas); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(e) (1991) (outlining the INS regulations on
E visas); Martin J. Lawler, E & L Visas for Foreign National Specialist Workers, in
2 IMIGRATION AND NATIONALrrY LAW 288, 288 (Edwin R. Rubin et al. eds., Am.
Imnigr. Lawyers Ass'n 1989) (listing the relevant publications for E-2 requirements
as: the State Department Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM); 22 C.P.R. § 41.51; 8 C.F.R.
§ 214.2(e); and INS Operations Instructions 214.2(b),(e)); Miller, supra note 21, at
833 (stating that in addition to the statute, the regulations and policies promulgated
by both the State Department and the INS also affect E visa case preparation); see
also Myers & Thompson, supra note 21, at 9 (stating that both the State Department
and INS regulations and policy comprise many of the E-2 definitional provisions).
23. See Goldstein, supra note 20, at 199 (stating that State Department is respon-
sible for accepting applications and issuing visas to the treaty investor or its qualified
employees); see also H. Ronald Klasko, Proposed E Visa Regulations: No Treaty
Between the INS and the State Department, 68 INTERPREmR RELEASs (Fed. Pubs.
Inc.) 1417, 1418 (Oct. 11, 1991) [hereinafter Klasko] (stating that the INS traditional-
ly defers to the State Department on issues of E-1 and E-2 eligibility); INS Proposes
E Visa Regulations, 68 INTERPRER RELEASES (Fed. Pubs. Inc.) 1113 (Aug. 30,
1991) (stating that the INS relies on the State Department's FAM in adjudicating E
visa applications); IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVIcE, OPFEARIONS IN-
STRUCTIONS (01) § 214.2(e) (1991), reprinted in IIOiliR. L. SERV. (CBC) 159, 160
(June 1991) [hereinafter INS OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS] (requiring consultation of
FAM notes to 22 C.F.R. § 41.40 and § 41.41 when considering matters involving
treaty traders and investors).
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eign Affairs Manual interpretative notes (FAM) as the "Consuls' Bible"
in E-2 matters.24
B. THE PRECONDITION OF A TREATY OR AGREEMENT
The existence of an authorizing treaty or agreement signed between
the United States and the country whose nationality the treaty investor
claims creates the basis of an E-2 treaty investor visa.' Prior to 1981,
the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN) constituted
the sole instrument that conferred either or both the E-1 and E-2 eli-
gibility status. 6 The BIT, which authorizes E-2 classification,27 aims
Until its recently proposed rules in 1991, the INS only promulgated two para-
graphs of guidelines on the requirements for the admission, extension, and mainte-
nance of E-2 treaty investor status. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(e) (1991); see Yanni, supra note
1, at 3 (emphasizing that a "a mere two paragraphs" outline INS regulations regarding
E nonimmigrant status). Only after the passage of the 1990 Act did the INS endeavor
to provide comprehensive regulations on E status. Id.
24. Richard S. Goldstein, Practice Tips for Treaty Trader and Treaty Investor
Visa Matters, in 2 IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK 156, 158 (R. Pat-
rick Murphy et al. eds., 1994); Lawrence D. Bastone, An Analysis of "E" Treaty
Alien Categories and Pending Regulations, in A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY, No.
C942, at 193, 195 (1994) (referring to the FAM).
25. INA § 101(a)(15)(E)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(E)(ii); FAM, supra note 6, at
81, notes 1.2, 2; see e.g., FRAGOMEN ET AL., supra note 9, § 3.2 (outlining the ap-
plicable to E visa requirements); GORDON ET AL., supra note 3, § 17.03 (same);
Myers & Thompson, supra note 21, at 9 (same); Ronald F. Storette, U.S. Immigration
and Nationality Law: Non-Immigrant Employment Visas and U.S. Permanent Resi-
dence, in 23RD ANNUAL IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION INSTrrUTE 75 (PLI
Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 404, 1990); see also In re
Inguanti, 11 1. & N. Dec. 393, 394 (1965) (holding that the INA does not require
the United States to issue an E-2 visa to an Italian treaty investor applicant when a
corresponding treaty providing for the entry of investors between the United States
and Italy does not exist).
26. See Ann A. Ruben, Recent Developments in Treaty Visa Practice, in 2 IMMI-
GRATION & NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK 147, 154 (R. Patrick Murphy et al. eds.,
1994) (explaining the history of the FCN treaty in conferring E status eligibility);
Citizens of Seven Countries to Gain E-2 Investor Status Under New Treaties, 69
INTERPRETER RELEASES (Fed. Pubs. Inc.) 1601, 1601-02 (Dec. 21, 1992) [hereinafter
Citizens of Seven Countries] (illustrating the importance of the FCN treaty as an
authorizing treaty to gain E status); Citizens of Eight Countries to Gain E-2 Status
Under New Treaties, 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES (Fed. Pubs. Inc.) 58 (Jan. 13, 1989)
[hereinafter Citizens of Eight Countries] (same); Timothy R. Hager, Comment, Recog-
nizing the Judicial and Arbitral Rights of Aliens to Review Consular Refusals of "E"
Visas, 66 TUL. L. REv. 203, 208 (1991) (same) (citing Citizens of Eight Countries);
Poles, Panamanians to Gain E-2 Status Under New Treaties, 68 INTERPRETER RE-
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to encourage and protect mutual investments by the nationals of both
countries and to guarantee equal treatment of the investors of both countries.s
LEASES (Fed. Pubs. Inc.) 390 (Apr. 1, 1991) [hereinafter Poles, Panamanians to Gain
E-2 Status] (same); GORDON ElT AL, supra note 3, § 17.03 (stating that not all of the
treaties conferring and authorizing E status constitute FCNs; liberally construed treaties
may qualify as FCNs vis-a-vis E status authorization). The last negotiations of the
FCN agreements ended in the late 1960s. Id.
The 1948 signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATIT)
eliminated the need for FCNs shortly thereafter. General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187; Citizens of Seven Countries,
supra, at 1602. Some multilateral trade agreements, such as GATT, however, do not
cover investment issues. Id.
27. GORDON ET At.., supra note 3, § 17.03; Citizens of Seven Countries, supra
note 26, at 1602 (describing how BITs accord E-2 status).
28. See FAM, supra note 6, at 81, note 1 (reminding the consulate officers of
the goal that E classification should increase and stimulate trade and investment be-
tween the United States and the treaty nation); Ruben, supra note 26, at 154 (stating
that BTs facilitate foreign investments abroad); Citizens of Eight Countries, supra
note 26, at 58 (stating that the BITs should encourage and protect American invest-
ment transactions in developing countries).
The BTs protect United States investors in four ways. First, the BITs provide
"competitive equality," which ensure equal treatment of United States and domestic
investors by the host country. Secondly, the BITs guarantee American investors the
right to transfer funds using a market rate of exchange and thirdly, provide interna-
tional arbitration as a forum for investment disputes. Fourthly, the BITs protect United
States investors if expropriations should occur. Bilateral Investment Treaties With the
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the People's Republic of the Congo, the Russian
Federation, Sri Lanka, and Tunisia, and Two Protocols to Treaties with Finland and
Ireland: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. On Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1992).
The BITs ordinarily become effective 30 days after ratification and remain
enforceable for at least a 10 years. Citizens of Seven Countries, supra note 26, at
1601; Citizens of Eight Countries, supra note 26, at 58.
Some BITs permit treaty investors to employ any professional, technical, and
managerial personnel of any nationality, while others limit the investors' employees to
top managerial personnel. Citizens of Seven Countries, supra note 26, at 1603; Citi-
zens of Eight Countries, supra note 26, at 58-59; Robert E. Banta, Recent Develop-
ments in the E Visa Category, in 2 IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW 253, 256
(Edwin R. Rubin et al. eds., Am. Immigr. Lawyers Ass'n 1989) (proposing the ratio-
nale that this restriction serves to force foreign employers "to fill a certain percentage
of their positions with local nationals").
The State Department explains that the former broader provision is "to provide
freedom of choice with respect to positions requiring special expertise or skills" and
to exclude partially the treaty investors from the enforcement of United States
antidiscrimination law: the treaty investor may discriminate based on nationality. Citi-
zens of Seven Countries, supra note 26, at 1603; Citizens of Eight Countries, supra
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Recently, the United States has employed other means of expanding
the E-2 eligibility, such as free trade agreements,29 exchange of recipro-
cal E-2 benefits,3 and protocols of amendments.3
Currently, the United States has treaty trader relationships with over
forty countries, and treaty investor relationships with over thirty coun-
tries. 2
note 26, at 59; Banta, supra at 256.
Although the FCN and BIT requirements and interpretations concerning the E-2
visa status remain substantially the same, the model BIT contains a provision that
added the activities of "establishing, administering, and advising" to the FCN provi-
sion of "developing and directing" an investment. Citizens of Seven Countries, supra
note 26, at 1602-03. The flexible nature of modern investment resulted in the broad-
ening in the scope of activities permitted by the treaty. Id. at 1603; see Hager, supra
note 26, at 209 (stating that BITs significantly expand the number of eligible E-2
visa applicants by enlarging the role of the investor with respect to the investment).
29. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1989, U.S.-Can., 27
I.L.M. 281 (1988). The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement conferred treaty
trade and treaty investors rights on Canadian citizens on January 1, 1989. Id. North
American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 289, 605
(1993); see North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No.
103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (implementing NAFrA in United States law). Mexican
citizens became eligible for E status on January 1, 1994, the effective date of
NAFTA. Id.
30. See IA of 1990 § 204, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (granting implicitly E-2 benefits
to Swedish and Australian nationals upon the exchange of reciprocal E-2 benefits
between the two countries); see also GORDON Er AL., supra note 3, § 17.03[2][a]
(stating that under the indirect language of the Immigration Act of 1990, Australian
and Swedish nationals may receive E benefits provided that Australia and Sweden
confer similar benefits to Americans); FRAGOMEN ElT AL.; supra note 9, § 3 (provid-
ing a similar discussion of reciprocal E benefits between treaty countries).
31. See FAM, supra note 6, at 81-89, notes 1-14, exhibit 1 (listing United States
protocols with Finland and Ireland as amending and broadening existing FCNs to in-
clude E-2 eligibility); see also GORDON ET AL., supra note 3, § 17.03. The amend-
ment of the protocol takes effect immediately upon ratification rather than 30 days
later. Citizens of Seven Countries, supra note 26, at 1603. The purpose of the proto-
cols, like the BITs, is to provide reciprocal treatment for Finnish and Irish investors
equal to that received by United States investors in Finland and Ireland. Id. at
1603-04.
32. INA § 101 (1990); see FAM, supra note 6, at 81-89, notes 1-14, exhibit 1
(listing the treaties containing treaty trader and treaty investor provisions between the
United States and other countries).
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C. BENEFITS AND USES OF THE E-2 VISA
Of the nonimmigrant visas, foreigners favor the E-2 treaty investor
visa the most because of its unique benefits.33 First, the INS generally
issues E-2 visas for a five year period, with five year extensions and
multiple entries available.' The initial period of stay is one year with
unlimited incremental extensions of one or two years.35 In addition,
INS automatically extends the E-2 duration of stay for one year upon
each new entry of the visaholder into the United States.' Second, un-
like most other nonimmigrants, E-2 visaholders need not maintain a
foreign residence.' nor are they required to assert a definite period of stay?3
33. See Grunblatt et al., supra note 3, at 81 (stating that the substantial benefits
E status confers are comparable to the benefits that permanent resident status entails);
Hager, supra note 26, at 207 (listing the numerous benefits provided by E visas);
Miller, supra note 21, at 833 (stating that "no other nonimmigrant status offers the
depth and quality of immigrant benefits to qualifying foreigners" as those provided by
the E-1 and E-2 visas).
34. GORDON Er AL., supra note 3, § 17.01; Grunblatt et al., supra note 3, at
1-3; see FRAGOMEN Er At, supra note 9, § 3.1 (discussing the advantage of lengthy
and multiple extensions); Myers & Thompson, supra note 21, at 10 (providing a
similar discussion on the advantages of allowing multiple year extensions).
35. INA § 214.2(e).
36. Grunblatt et al., supra note 3, at 85. Less than 30 days of traveling to Cana-
da or Mexico, however, will not trigger the automatic extension upon entry to the
United States. Id.
37. FAM, supra note 6, at 89, note 14. As a nonimmigrant visa holder, the
treaty investor must declare unequivocal intent to depart upon termination of the E-2
status. Id. E-2 status terminates when the treaty investor no longer maintains the
requirements of an E-2 classification or when the visaholder changes employers with-
out INS approval. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(e) (1990); see Yanni, supra note 1, at 8 (pmvid-
ing a discussion on the requirements a treaty investor must adhere to when E-2 status
terminates).
An E-2 nonimmigrant, however, can possess dual intent. See FAM, supra note
6, at 89, note 14 (stating that an E-2 visaholder can petition for an immigrant visa
and at the same time, possess the requisite intent to depart the United States upon
termination of visa status and not remain in the United States illegally).
An E-2 visaholder may maintain, without being inconsistent for the purposes of
United States immigration laws, intent to remain permanently in the United States
lawfully and nonimmigrant intent to depart. Id; see also Garavito v. INS, 901 F.2d
173, 176-77 (1st Cir. 1990) (analyzing the doctrine of dual intent when an alien
attempts to change the classification of their visa to category E-2); Lauvik v. INS,
910 F.2d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that a nonimmigrant who enters the Unit-
ed States as an employee or officer of an organization can develop a subjective intent
to stay indefinitely in the United States without violating their visa or immigration
laws). See generally Myers & Thompson, supra note 21. at 3-4 (discussing the pre-
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Third, E-2 status permits treaty investors to engage in various inciden-
tal activities to the investment without prior approval. 9 Lastly, E-2 sta-
tus affords the same E-2 benefits to the holders' (accompanying) spouse
and/or unmarried children under twenty-one years of age. The same
family members do not have to hold the same nationality as the princi-
pal treaty investor and may work without being subject to deportation
proceedings.' If the principal treaty investor becomes a permanent resi-
dent, the dependents still retain or obtain E-2 status as long as the prin-
cipal treaty investor remains eligible for the E-2 status.4
sumption of immigrant intent and briefly, dual intent).
38. See FAM, supra note 6, at 89, note 14 (stating that merely expressing un-
equivocal intent to depart the United States upon the termination of E-status suffices);
Yanni, supra note 1, at 8; Myers & Thompson, supra note 21, at 10 (noting FAM's
requirements); Goldstein, supra note 24, at 112 (discussing FAM's statement's); Hager,
supra note 26, at 207; GORDON ET AL. supra note 3, § 17.08.
39. FAM, supra note 6, at 83, note 7; see GORDON ET AL., supra note 3,
§ 17.07[l] (stating that so long as the investment purpose remains paramount...
[the treaty investor could engage] . . . in social, educational, entertainment and cultur-
al activities"); see also S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 563 (1950) (dis-
cussing the various eligibility requirements that E-2 visa holders must maintain). The
treaty investor, however, cannot change employers without prior INS approval.
GORDON ET AL., supra note 3, § 17.07[1]; E Visas/H-1 PetitionsIL-1 Petitions- Up-
dates, in 1994 IMMiGR. L. UPDATE: NEW DEv., PROC. & REG. 205, 207 (N.Y. St. B.
Ass'n, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 3-4, 1994, at 205, 207 [hereinafter E Visas Updates]
(stating that incidental activities may continue as long as E-2 eligibility continues).
40. INS OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 23, § 214.2(e); INS Discusses
Employment of E-2 Dependents, 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 376 (Apr. 3, 1989) [here-
inafter INS Discusses Employment] (correspondence reply by Lawrence J. Weinig, INS
Deputy Assistant Commissioner for Adjudications) (providing clarification of certain
issues regarding the employment of dependents of E-2 nonimmigrants and subsequent
applications for an amendment of status); see e.g., Banta, supra note 28, at 257 (stat-
ing that the INS confirms that employment by E-1 and E-2 dependents will not result
in their deportation); Yanni, supra note 1, at 9 (stating that dependents accompanying
a nonimmigrant investor or employee can obtain E-2 visas with the same duration of
stay as the principal family member); GORDON ET AL., supra note 3, § 17.07 (provid-
ing a similar discussion on dependents obtaining E-2 status); Grunblatt et al., supra
note 3, at 8 (same). The INS does not authorize employment by E-2 treaty investors,
dependents, however, they confirm that their employment will make them ineligible
for change or adjustment of status. INS Discusses Employment, supra at 376;
Grunblatt et al., supra note 3, at 88. "The violation of visa status through employ-
ment . . . is not viewed as harshly as to warrant a deportation remedy because of
the esteem in which E visaholders are held, and the important foreign policy consid-
eration to encourage bilateral trade and investment." Id. Ineligible E-2 dependents
could obtain permanent resident status or another nonimmigrant status, by way of the
visa route, through consulates abroad. GORDON ET AL., supra note 3, § 17.07.
41. Yanni, supra note 1, at 9; GORDON ET AL., supra note 3, § 17.07; see More
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In sum, investors prefer the E-2 visa because it provides easy and
"immediate entry [to as well as] ... continued presence in the U.S."
Treaty investors who need to reside in the United States for an extended
period of time find the E-2 visa particularly useful to oversee or work
in a treaty enterprise.'3
II. CURRENT LAW
Although the Immigration and Nationality Act accords E-2 status to
principal treaty investors only," the regulations make the E-2 visa
available to employees of the treaty employer.' In order to establish
E-2 treaty investor eligibility, the applicant must meet the specific agen-
cy-created elements or tests in each of the following statutorily mandat-
ed requirements:'
on Adjustment of Status for Dependents of E Nonimmigrants, 67 INTERPRETER RE-
LEASES 951, 952 (Aug. 27, 1990) (stating that an investor's daughter could remain in
the United States under derivative E-2 status, while the investor undergoes consular
processing of adjustment of status to United States permanent residency).
42. Grunblatt et al., supra note 3, at 81. The nonimmigrant E-2 benefits resemble
the rights conferred on immigrant visaholders. Id.; Miller, supra note 21, at 833.
43. FRAGOMmN ET AL., supra note 9, § 3.
44. INA § 101(a)(15)(E)(ii); see Paul W. Ferrell, The Corporate Alien and Treaty
Visa Nationality, 7 GEO. IIMIGR. LJ. 283 (1993) (stating that the INA barely deals
with treaty corporations or treaty employees, and does not address the question of
treaty employee visa eligibility requirements).
45. See 22 C.F.R. § 41.51(c) (1991) (defining "employee" of treaty trader or in-
vestor); see also FAM, supra note 6, at 87, note 13 (providing that a treaty
employer's E-1 or E-2 status entitles a treaty employee to the same status); INS
OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 23, § 214.2(e); State Dept. Discusses E Visa
Status, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1361 (Oct. 7, 1994) [hereinafter State Dept. Dis-
cusses E Visa Status] (stating that the principal investor gives rise to employee E
status because the statute does not authorize independent investor E status for employ-
ees).
46. FAM, supra note 6, at 81, note 1.2. For a brief overview of the E-2 visa
eligibility requirements, see Storette, supra note 25, at 5; Goldstein, note 20, at 123;
E Visas Updates, supra note 31, at 206-07; Lawler, supra note 22, at 289-91; Sarah
A. Tobocman & Larry S. Rifkin, Employment of Nonimmigrant Aliens After
IMMAC190, FLA. B. J., May 1992, at 14-15; Ivener, supra note 20, at 2-3; Margaret
C. Makar, Foreign Entrepreneurship in the United States, 23 COLO. LAW. 35, 35
(1994); Ethan E. Kaufman, Staffing Business Operations with Foreign Nationals: The
Nonimmigrant (Temporary Visa Options), NJ. LAw. Feb.-Mar., 1995, at 4-5; Steven
C. Bell, Nonimmigrant Visa Categories: The Nonpetition Categories, in PLI COTINU-
ING LEGAL ASSISTANT TRAINING (R) WORKSHOP FOR LEGAL ASSISTANTS 1994: BAsic
IM IGRATION PROCEDURES 43 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series
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1. Possession of the nationality of the treaty country.47
2. Active and substantial investment (employer only).'
3. Specific role in the enterprise (for employer, it is to develop and
direct; for employee, the position must either be executive/supervisory or
essential).49
4. Nonimmigrant intent to depart.50
The remainder of this section will discuss in detail the first three
statutory requirements.
A. TREATY AND NATIONALITYs'
The treaty permits only the nationals of the treaty countries to apply
for the E-2 visa. 2 This requirement applies to the principal investor
No. 500 (1994)).
47. See FAM, supra note 6, at 81, note 1.2 (citing to 22 C.F.R. § 41.51 and
listing the requirements for the E-2 treaty investor).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. INA § 214(b); Myers & Thompson, supra note 21, at 3 (citing 22 C.F.R.
§ 41.11 (1991)).
51. See FAM, supra note 6, at 81, note 3 (defining nationality as that
"determined by the authorities of the country of which the alien claims nationality, or
by the alien's country of birth or subsequent country of citizenship"). A national of a
country is defined as one who owes "permanent allegiance to [that] state." See Yanni,
supra note 1, at 4 (quoting INA § 101(a)(21), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(21)). Ordinarily,
the passport tendered proves nationality. Yanni, supra note 1, at 4; GORDON ET AL.,
supra note 3, § 17.03[3][a].
The legally and politically predominant citizenship that an applicant holds
provides the nationality of a dual national for determining investor status. FAM, supra
note 6, at 81, note 3.3; see In re Ognibene, 18 1. & N. Dec. 425, 427-28 (1983)
(holding that the applicant, who the United States admitted as an Italian citizen, with
which the United States had no E visa authorizing agreement in 1983, cannot now
use citizenship as a "badge of convenience" by employing his Italian citizenship to
qualify for E-2 status). The nationality established by a dual national "at the time of
his entry to the United States ...is his sole or operative nationality for his duration
of his temporary stay in the United States. Id. at 428; see also In re Damioli, 17 1.
& N. Dec. 303 (1980) (finding a native born United States citizen who gained Italian
nationality throufgh marriage did not qualify for treaty investor status because she
failed to relinquish her United States citizenship voluntarily). The employer cannot
interchange dual nationalities to receive certain government benefits by claiming one
nationality over the other. Id. at 307.
52. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing E status eligibility and
requirements for classification). Stateless persons cannot qualify for E-2 visas. Yanni,
supra note 1, at 4.
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(individual or business organization)" and to the employee treaty inves-
tor, who must possess the same nationality as the principal treaty inves-
tor.' As previously noted, however, the dependents of the principal
treaty investor need not satisfy the nationality requirement.'
United States citizens and permanent residents cannot confer E-2
status upon the employee treaty investor.' Furthermore, the INS will
not consider them as an owner of the treaty enterprise to satisfy the
nationality requirement.'
The nationality of a company is the country of citizenship of the
individual owners whose ownership comprises at least fifty-percent of
the business."8 This fifty-percent rule also applies to multi-level busi-
nesses by tracing the ultimate owners' nationality.5 The company's
53. FAM, supra note 6, at 81, note 3; see, e.g., FRAGO.MEN ET AL., supra note
9, § 3.2 (c); Myers & Thompson, supra note 21, at 7-8; GORDON ET AL., supra note
3, § 17.03.
54. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing the investment and eli-
gibility requirements for treaty investors and employees); see also In re Lee, 15 I. &
N. Dec. 187, 189 (Reg. Comm'r 1975) (holding that relevancy of the nationality of
the enterprise applies only when the applicant seeks E-2 status as an employee).
When the applicant applies for individual investor treaty status, the INS does not
preclude the applicant from eligibility simply "by the fact that the enterprise is pres-
ently owned by a person or persons who are not themselves treaty investors" Id.
55. 22 C.F.R. § 41.51(d) (1991).
56. See In re Damioli, 17 I. & N. Dec. 303, 305-06 (Reg. Comm'r. 1980) (hold-
ing that since the INS precludes eligibility of United States citizens for treaty investor
status, foreign employees cannot obtain E-2 status through their United States employ-
ers).
57. See also State Dept. Discusses E Visa Status, supra note 45, at 1361 (quot-
ing a correspondence by H. Edward Odom, Chief of the State Department Advisory
Opinions Division for Visa Services) (stating that if the Canadian owner of a treaty
enterprise became a lawful permanent resident of the United States, employees cannot
obtain E-2 status, even if the employer does not reside in the United States).
58. 22 C.F.R. § 41.51 (c)(2) (1991); FAM, supra note 6, at 82, note 3.1 (stating
the nationality of a corporation or treaty investor status is the nationality of persons
who own at least 50% of stock in the corporation); see, e.g., GORDON Er AL., supra
note 3, § 17.03[3][b] (same); FRAGOm.N -T FAL, supra note 9, § 3.2(b) (same);
Grunblatt et al., supra note 3, at 82 (same); E Visas Updates, supra note 39, at 207
(same).
The owners must also be holders of the E visa if residing in the United States.
22 C.F.R. § 41.51(c)(2) (1991); GORDON ET AL., supra note 3, § 17.03[31[o].
59. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing the definitive meaning
of nationality). For publicly-traded companies, where difficulties arise in establishing
nationality through stock ownership records, the INS presumes nationality in the coun-
try where the company primarily lists and exchanges its stock. FAM, supra note 6. at
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place of incorporation or principal place of business holds no weight in
the determination of its nationality for E-2 visa eligibility.W°
B. ACTIVE INVESTMENT
The FAM interprets an active investment as that which involves the
possession and control of irrevocably committed funds that the treaty
investor places at his or her personal risk.6' Under the element of pos-
session and control, the treaty investor may obtain funds from inside or
outside the United States,"2 as long as the investor acquires them from
legitimate sources.' To establish the element of irrevocably committed
82, note 3.2. The applicant should provide the best available evidence to support the
presumption. Id.; see, e.g., State Dept. Discusses Standards for Corporate Nationality
for E Visas, 66 INTERPRETER RELEASES 101, 101 (Jan. 23, 1989) (stating that where
the INS cannot determine nationality by a percentage of stock out, it presumes nation-
ality lies where the principal trading and exchanging of stock occur); FRAGOMEN ET
AL., supra note 9, § 3.2(b) (stating for large public companies where the INS faces
difficulty in determining ownership, the INS presumes the firm possesses the nation-
ality of the country where it initially lists its stock); GORDON ET AL., supra note 3, §
17.03 (stating that the INS can presume nationality of a company lies in the country
of its incorporation, if its stock "is widely dispersed and is sold exclusively on an
exchange in that country").
60. FAM, supra note 6, at 82, note 3.2.; see e.g., FRAGOMEN ET AL., supra note
9, § 3.2(b); E Visa Updates, supra note 39, at 207; Ferrell, supra note 44, at 3-6
(arguing that pursuant to the INA definition, the place of incorporation presumes
corporate nationality).
61. FAM, supra note 6, at 83, note 7.
62. Id. at 83-84, note 7.1-1.
63. See id. at 83-84, note 7.1-1 (listing examples of legitimate sources of obtain-
ing funds as: savings, gifts, inheritances, and contests). The utilization of such funds
in an enterprise constitutes an investment. Id. The INS, however, precludes inheritance
of a business as an investment, although purchasing the enterprise with the inherited
funds would constitute an investment. Id. But see Inherited Business OK for Treaty
Investors, INS Says, 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES 426 (Apr. 6, 1992) (quoting a corre-
spondence by Lawrence J. Weining, Acting INS Assistant Commissioner for Adjudica-
tions) (stating that inherited businesses could qualify as a substantial investment if the
investor possesses actual ownership). The INS could require proof that the treaty
investor applicant provided the funds for investment. See Nice v. Turage, 752 F.2d
431, 432 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding as insufficient, the proof provided by treaty investor
applicant of source of funds for investment purposes). Because the INS requires immi-
grant investors to show that they obtained the capital for investment by lawful means,
the INS could also impose such a duty upon nonimmigrant investors. 8 C.F.R.
§§ 204.6, 204.6(e) (1990); see Lee v. Thornburg, No. Civ. A. 90-3940-I, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 701, at *4 (D.La. Jan. 14, 1992) (stating that the existence of family
funds, in and of itself, fails to provide sufficient proof that the treaty investor has
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funds, the applicant must show more than a mere intent to invest ' and
must demonstrate that the business operation is set to begin.' Finally,
the element of risk requires that the treaty investor employ the funds "in
the hope of generating a financial return," and not merely place the
funds in a bank account or in a speculative investment .' The FAM
also specifies that capital must be subject to partial or total loss if busi-
personal possession and control of funds).
64. FAM, supra note 6, at 84, note 7.1-3(b).
65. Id. note 7.1-3(b). If the alien investors have reached only the stage of sign-
ing contracts or searching for suitable locations, the FAM does not consider the in-
vestors to have irrevocably committed the capital and "in the process of investing."
Id.; see Sun Hee Han v. Hendricks, 949 F.2d 399 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that an
applicant's deposit of $6,000 in a $415,000 enterprise at the time of the application
does not attain the stage of close to the start of the business operation); Myers &
Thompson, supra note 21, at 12 (stating that the process of investing requires being
close to the start of business); Grunblatt et al., supra note 3, at 82 (noting that con-
tract signing or a location search fails to satisfy the requirement of close to the start
of business); GORDON ET AL., supra note 3, § 17.06[2][a].
Essentially, the treaty applicant must reach "a point of no return." Yanni, supra
note 1, at 5; GORDON Er AL., supra note 3, § 17.06[2][a]. If the commitment is
pending upon the issuance of the E-2 visa, the FAM still considers the commitment
in-evocable. FAM, supra note 6, at 84, note 7.1-3; GORDON ET AL., supra note 3.
§ 17.06.
An application by a treaty investor who has already invested has a better
chance of approval than an application by one who is "actively in the process of
investing." GORDON ET AL, supra note 3, § 17.06; see Goldstein, supra note 20, at
150 (stating that practical experience in Europe and Asia shows that the application
of a treaty alien who "actively [engages] in the process of investing," faces extreme
difficulty in obtaining approval).
66. FAM, supra note 6, at 84, note 7.1-2; see In re Chung, 15 I. & N. Dec.
681 (1976) (finding that the applicant failed to establish the active investment element
when the only evidence submitted was $10,400 worth of a savings account held for
future investment in a shoe manufacturing business); In re Heitland, 14 I. & N. Dec.
563 (1974) (holding that "funds deposited in an idle bank account cannot be consid-
ered as part of an investment").
The FAM, however, holds that a reasonable amount of cash held in a bank
account for routine business operations constitutes an active investment. FAM, supra
note 6, at 84, note 7.1-2.
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ness fortunes reverse.67 The FAM defines a qualifying enterprise as
real, active, for profit, and producing some service or commodity.'
C. SUBSTANTIAL INVESTMENT
The Immigration Act of 1990 delegates the power to define the term
"substantial" to the State Department. 9 The State Department persis-
tently rejects the idea to set a specific minimum dollar amount in deter-
mining substantiality, in order to conform with the flexible nature of
modem international investments.70 Instead, the State Department em-
67. FAM, supra note 6, at 84, note 7.1-2; see Goldstein, supra note 20, at 150
(stating that an applicant should demonstrate that if the business fails, they possess
more than enough capital, to close-up the operation, and return to their home coun-
try).
Thus, only loans secured by the applicant's own personal assets qualify as an
active investment, whereas the FAM deems loans guaranteed by the assets of the
enterprise as qualifying because they lack an element of risk. FAM, supra note 6, at
84, note 7.1-2; see In re Ognibene, 18 I. & N. Dec. 425, 428-29 (1978) (holding
that an applicant's real estate transactions, based on mortgage debt or commercially
secured loans, have no requisite element of risk). An applicant cannot consider loans
guaranteed by a party other than the treaty applicant as part of the applicant's invest-
ment. See In re Csonka, 17 I. & N. Dec. 254 (1978) (holding that possessing an
intent to invest fails to satisfy the requirement of investment).
68. FAM, supra note 6, at 84-85, note 8; Yanni, supra note 1, at 5. A fictitious
paper operation does not qualify as a valid enterprise. GORDON ET AL., supra note 3,
§ 17.06, n.5 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1952)) (stating that
Congress contemplated investments as real operating enterprises, and not as fictitious
paper businesses).
69. Immigration Act § 204 (1990) (defining substantial as "such an amount of
trade or capital as is established by the Secretary of State, after consultation with
appropriate agencies of government").
70. Goldstein, supra note 20, at 160; see FAM, supra note 6, at 85, note 9.1
(declining to set a minimum dollar figure for the substantiality requirement); DOS
Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,565-67 (stating that the flexible approach accommodates
various sizes of businesses); see also Grunblatt et al., supra note 3, at 85 (stating
that the test for substantiality avoids excluding small businesses from obtaining E-2
status).
Some practitioners assert that the Consuls and the INS officers generally con-
sider investments in excess of $100,000 as obtaining the substantiality requirement.
Barbara W. Loli, Recent Developments in the "E" Practice, in 2 IMMIGRATION AND
NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK 110, 112 (R. Patrick Murphy et al. eds., 1991). Others
claim that a minimum investment of $250,000 is sufficient to meet the substantiality
requirement. Manfred Rosenow, "Substantial" Investment Key to Gaining Residency,
MLAMI HERALD, Dec. 7, 1992, at 19BM.
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ploys the "proportionality test" and the "marginality test" in evaluating
the substantiality of the investment."
The "proportionality test" requires an assessment of the percentage of
interest the treaty investor has in the enterprise.' The test weighs the
amount invested3 against the cost or value of a business.74 The FAM
describes the "proportionality test" as an "inverted sliding scale."'75
Thus, the higher the cost of the business, the lower the percentage of
investment amount required to meet the test.76 The FAM provides ex-
The INS, unlike the State Department, favors a bright line test setting a specif-
ic dollar figure. Loli, supra, at 112; see In re Valsh and Pollard, Interim Dec. No.
3111, 1988 BIA LEXIS 55, at *136 (1988) (upholding the State Department's flexible
test while rejecting the INS argument that a minimum dollar amount necessarily satis-
fies the "substantiality test").
71. FAM, supra note 6, at 85-86, notes 9, 10.
72. See id at 85, note 9.3 (comparing the amount invested to the cost or value
of the business). Thus, the INS does not consider the value of the investment alone
as a sufficient factor. Id.; see also Goldstein, supra note 20, at 151 (illustrating the
comparison between the amount invested and the value of the business).
73. See Myers & Thompson, supra note 21, at 2 (stating that the INS defines
the amount of qualifying funds invested as the value of the investor's assets at risk
in the enterprise); Grunblatt et al., supra note 3, at 85. Qualifying funds can include
cash invested in the enterprise, monthly payments for leased property or equipment.
and the purchasing value of goods or equipment for the business operation. FAM,
supra note 6, at 84, note 7.2.
74. FAM, supra note 6, at 85, note 9.1; see e.g., Miller, supra note 21, at 834;
Goldstein, supra note 20, at 127; Myers & Thompson, supra note 21, at 12; Yanni,
supra note 1, at 6.
The FAM defines the cost of an established business as its purchase price or
the fair market value. FAM, supra note 6, at 85, note 9.1. An applicant may com-
pute the actual value of an established business from its tax valuation. Goldstein,
supra note 20, at 127. The FAM defines the cost of establishing a business as the
actual amount or the amount normally considered necessary to make the particular
type of business operational. FAM, supra note 6, at 85, note 9.1. This part of the
"proportionality test" may pose a problem because it involves the use of personal
judgement or knowledge of United States businesses by the consular officer.
Goldstein, supra note 20, at 129; see State Dept. Summarizes Recent AILA Liaison
Meeting, 67 INTERPRETER RELEAsEs 211, 212-13 (Feb. 26, 1990) (stating that small to
medium sized businesses need not have an investment of at least 50% investment if
the prevailing practice in setting up such businesses do not have such a requirement).
75. FAM, supra note 6, at 85, note 9.3.
76. Id. at 85, note 9.3; see Miller, supra note 21, at 834 (stating that the con-
sular officer uses a subjective standard to determine the reasonableness of the
applicant's investment amount for the type of business contemplated). The FAM in-
structs the officer to "draw on personal knowledge of the United States business
scene." Myers & Thompson, supra note 21, at 12 (directing officers to use personal
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amples of what constitutes the percentage requirements for businesses
with different establishing costs. 7 The FAM deliberately chooses vague
language to avoid creating the impression of a bright-line test." The
State Department continues to stress that it provides examples only to
demonstrate the concept of the test.
79
In order to meet the substantiality requirement, the treaty investor
must also satisfy the "marginality test."8 Substantiality involves the
applicant's assets in the investment enterprise, whereas marginality refers
to the applicant's estimated return on the investment.' The FAM de-
fines marginality as "solely for the purpose of earning a living." 2 To
demonstrate that the enterprise is more than marginal, that is, not merely
for subsistence, the applicant must present proof that he or she has other
sources of income, 3 that the return from the business exceeds normal
knowledge of business environments to determine reasonableness of investments); see
Goldstein, supra note 20, at 128 (stating that the consular officer uses personal
knowledge of the United States business climate to determine reasonableness of the
applicant's estimate for the particular type of business involved).
77. See FAM, supra note 6, at 85, note 9.3 (noting several examples in assessing
the "proportionality test").
78. Id. The examples contain a flexible choice of language such as "would easily
meet the test," "might require," "demand generally," "might be needed," "might suf-
fice," and "a much lower percentage". Id.
79. See id. (requiring consideration of all factors and not simply performing an
arithmetic exercise).
80. Id. at 86, note 10; Yanni, supra note 1, at 7.
81. Goldstein, supra note 20, at 129; FRAGOMEN Frr AL., supra note 9, § 3.2(e);
see FAM, supra note 6, at 85-86, notes 9.3, 10 (providing examples for evaluating an
investment in order to determine if investment provides only for the livelihood of the
applicant).
82. FAM, supra note 6, at 86, note 10; see Myers & Thompson, supra note 21,
at 12 (stating that the belief that an investment should create employment opportuni-
ties rather than simply providing livelihood forms the basis of the "marginal invest-
ment" test).
83. See FAM, supra note 6, at 85, note 9.3 (providing the proportionality test);
Goldstein, supra note 20, at 129 (noting that substantial income from other sources
can indicate that investment exceeds the marginal level); Grunblatt et al., supra note
3, at 5; see, e.g., Kwang Woon Choi v. INS, 798 F.2d 1189, 1191 (8th Cir. 1986)
(holding that the INS should consider stock certificates as proof of additional sources
of income to disprove marginality); Dong In Chung v. INS, 662 F. Supp. 474, 475
(9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the "marginality test" must apply to each situation in its
entirety, and an investor's evidence of significant assets other than a motel investment
may preclude a finding of marginality); Lauvik v. INS, 910 F.2d 658, 661 (9th Cir.
1990) (finding that an alien with substantial assets, other than a trailer park invest-
ment, as meeting the marginality requirement); In re Kung, 17 I. & N. Dec. 260, 262
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living costs,' or that the business will create employment opportunities
or contribute to the local economy.' Similar to the "substantiality test,"
the "marginality test" permits the consular officers some flexibility in
adjudicating E-2 visas."
D. ROLE OF THE EMPLOYER: To DEVELOP AND DIRECT
Both the principal and employee treaty investor must perform a spe-
cific and important role in the enterprise. 7 The INA requires that the
principal treaty investor develop and direct the operations of an enter-
prise.8 The State Department interprets "developing and directing" an
operation to mean a person having a controlling interest in the enterprise
either by means of at least fifty-percent ownership, or by managerial
authority and responsibilities, if ownership is fifty-percent or less in a
joint venture or corporate investment structure." Thus, a partner in a
(Reg. Comm'r. 1978) (finding that although the franchisee invested S53,000 in a
marginal enterprise, the enterprise could not be considered as marginal when the fran-
chisee had an additional $46,000 of reserved funds).
84. See FAM, supra note 6, at 85, note 9.3 (providing the proportionality test).
85. Id. But see Kun Young Kim v. INS, 586 F.2d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1978)
(holding that producing an economic advantage to a local economy alone does not
make an investment substantial).
86. See FAM, supra note 6, at 86, note 10 (instructing the consulate officers to
consider the fact that newly formed businesses or businesses undergoing changes often
do not generate a significant amount of return).
87. See FAM, supra note 6, at 86-87, notes 11, 13 (requiring the treaty investor
to develop and direct, and the treaty employee to have executive and supervisory or
essential responsibility).
88. INA § 1101(a)(15)(E)(ii). The INA also limits the investor's activities to
"solely" developing and directing. Id. But see Yanni, supra note 1, at 5 (arguing that
the FAM places minimal emphasis on this limit and permits incidental activities).
See also supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing the E-2 visa eligibility
requirements); GORDON Er AL., supra note 3, § 17.06 (stating that ambiguity remains
about the purpose of the word "solely"); Lauvik, 910 F.2d at 661 (holding that a
treaty investor could perform some menial tasks as long as his primary function in-
volves directing, managing, and protecting his investment).
89. FAM, supra note 6, at 86, note 11; Kwang Woon Choi v. INS, 798 F.2d
1189, 1192 (8th Cir. 1986); see In re Lee, 15 1. & N. Dec. 187, 190 (Reg. Comm'r.
1975) (holding that an applicant's investment of S10,000 in a $90,000 enterprise does
not give him a controlling interest in the enterprise and thus, he does not satisfy the
statutory requirement of "develop and direct").
The standard form of business partnerships, however, will not ordinarily give
rise to a sufficient controlling interest. Id. Goldstein, supra note 20, at 151 (noting
that the 51% rule will not necessarily be enforced). Control by ownership alone does
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joint venture could have control through negative control,' and a mi-
nority shareholder could "develop and direct" the corporation by exercis-
ing de facto or operational control.9
E. ROLE OF THE EMPLOYEE: ExECuTIvE AND SUPERVISORY
A majority of E-2 applicants are treaty employees.9 The treaty em-
ployee meets the important role requirement by either: performing prin-
cipally, as opposed to incidentally, executive and supervisory responsibil-
not necessarily meet the "develop and direct" test if evidence exists showing that the
control may be lost through pledging stock, giving proxies, or surrendering rights by
contract. GORDON ET AL., supra note 3, § 17.06; sre In re Walsh & Pollard, Interim
Dec. No. 3111, 1988 BIA LEXIS 55, *136, 137 (1988) (stating that "[t]he particulars
of each enterprise should be reviewed to determine whether by organizational or
structural device the investor is in a position to 'develop and direct"').
90. FAM, supra note 6, at 86, note 11.1. Negative control occurs when two
equal partners each retain full management rights and responsibilities. Id. Thus, deci-
sions bind both partners. Id; see also Yanni, supra note 1, at 4-5 (recognizing the
recent practice of measuring control by veto power of the 50% owner).
91. FAM, supra note 6, at 86, note 11.2 (discussing negative control); Goldstein,
supra note 20, at 129; see Myers & Thompson, supra note 21, at 12 (noting that de
facto or operational control can be obtained through a management agreement, differ-
ent forms of stocks, or even technical competence in the area not possessed by other
stockholders); Miller, supra note 21, at 5 (providing that the terms of the franchise
agreement will also be examined to determine the amount of control the investor
franchise recipient retains); see also In re Kung, 17 I. & N. Dec. 260, 263-64 (Reg.
Comm'r. 1978) (finding that an investor applicant has the ability to develop and
direct when non-limiting factors overshadow the limiting requirements of the franchise
agreement); State Dept. Speaks on Amount of Control for E-2 Investor Status, 69
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1212, 1213 (Sept. 28, 1992) (stating that a 50% owner must
demonstrate negative control to prove the ability to develop and direct).
92. See Grunblatt et al., supra note 3, at 86 (stating that those in the restaurant
business frequently use E-2 visas because restaurant managers and chefs often apply
as E-2 employees); Deborah J. Notkin, Nonimmigrant Visa Options for the Restaurant
Industry, in 2 IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK 82 (R. Patrick Murphy
et al. eds., 1995).
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ities;93 or by possessing special skills necessary for the operation of the
enterpriseY
The State Department failed to provide a specific definition for the
terms "executive and supervisory."9 5 Rather, the State Department con-
siders determinative factors on a case-by-case basis, when evaluating the
executive and supervisory nature of the employee position.'
F. ROLE OF THE ESSENTIAL EMPLOYEE
To qualify as an essential treaty employee, the applicant must possess
special skills that are vital to the operation of the enterprise.' The
FAM sets forth four examples of essential functions dividing them into
categories of long-term and short-term need."
The employee may perform one of the following four types of func-
tions: 1) to be involved in the start-up of the enterprise, using the
employee's familiarity with, and knowledge of, the peculiarities of the
overseas operation (short-term);' 2) to train and supervise personnel in
93. FAM, supra note 6, at 87, note 13; INS OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, supra
note 23, § 214.2(e) (noting that a qualified technician may receive a classification as
a treaty trader if he qualifies as a national of a treaty country); Grunblatt et al.,
supra note 3, at 85; see In re Walsh and Pollard, Int. Dec. 3111, 1988 BIA LEXIS
55, *136, 137-38 (1988) (stating that treaty employees do not have to meet the "de-
velop and direct" requirement); H. Ronald Klasko, Significance of Matters of Walsh
and Pollard, in 2 II.SlGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW 267, 278-80 (Edwin R. Ru-
bin et al. eds., Am. Immigr. Lawyers Ass'n 1989) (commenting on whether treaty
employees have to meet the "develop and direct" test).
94. See FAM, supra note 6, at 87, note 13 (discussing the requirements for the
E-1 or E-2 employee).
95. Yanni, supra note 1, at 16; see FAM, supra note 6. at 87-88, note 13.2
(providing, without a definition, the relevant factors to be considered in evaluating the
executive and supervisory element).
96. FAM, supra note 6, at 87-88, note 13.2. These factors, among others, in-
clude: 1) the title of the position; 2) the position within the company hierarchy,
3) the duties, 4) the extent of control and responsibility;, 5) the number and skill
levels of employees to be supervised, 6) the compensation; and 7) prior executive or
supervisory experience. Id.
97. Id. at 87, note 13.3; GORDON ET AL., supra note 3, § 17.04; Ruben, supra
note 26, at 152; Yanni, supra note 1, at 17.
98. See FAM, supra note 6, at 88, note 13.3-1 (stating that the examples repre-
sent the extremes of a broad spectrum that allows consular officers to obtain some
perspective on the length of time that employers will need employees to perform es-
sential functions).
99. See FAM, supra note 6, at 88, note 13.3-1 (discussing the duration of essen-
tial functions).
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the manufacturing, maintenance and repair functions (short-term);'
3) to develop continuously product improvement and quality control
(long-term);... 4) to provide service unavailable in the United States
(long-term)."°e
The State Department considers the E-2 visa as designated specifically
for specialists in order to protect the ordinary skilled workers in the
United States. 10 3 Therefore, the essential treaty employee bears the bur-
den of proof"° in establishing: the specialized qualities of these
skills;0 5 the essentiality of, or the need for, the special skills;"° pos-
session of these skills;'" and the period of duration for such skills.'
For the short-term essential employee, who possesses transferrable
skills, the treaty employer must train replacement United States workers
within a reasonable time frame,'" which the consular officer can set at
the time of the application."0 Again, the FAM adheres to a flexible
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. FAM, supra note 6, at 89, note 13.3.
103. See id. at 88, note 13.3-1 (stating that the Immigration Law Service inten-
tionally designed the E classification for specialists and not for ordinary skilled work-
ers); see also Yanni, supra note 1, at 17 (stating that the INS mainly used the E-2
classification to increase employment opportunities for United States workers).
104. FAM, supra note 6, at 88-89, notes 13.3-1, 13.3-2; Goldstein, supra note 20,
at 199 (referring to the State Department Visa Office's response to interrogatories for
clarification on eligibility requirements).
105. See FAM, supra note 6, at 88, note 13.3-2 (discussing the general factors for
the consideration of E-2 qualifications).
106. See id. at 88, note 13.3-1 (discussing the duration of "essential" status).
107. See id. at 88-89, note 13.3-2 (discussing the general factors considered in de-
termining the qualifications of E-2 employees).
108. See id. at 88, note 13.3-1 (discussing the duration of essentiality).
109. See id. at 89, note 13.3-3 (citing to 22 C.F.R. § 41.51) (stating that the
FAM refers the consular officers to the factors in note 13.3-2 to determine the rea-
sonable time frame for training and replacement). One may determine "reasonableness"
by such factors as the length of experience and training that the current employee
had with the company. Id.
110. Id. at 89, note 13.3-3; see Goldstein, supra note 20, at 202-03 (explaining
that the FAM contains an implicit requirement to train if the employees have readily
transferrable skills and that they need not train and replace employees who possess
essential skills for an indefinite length of time); see also Lawler, supra note 22, at
292 (stating that consular officers must recognize and consider conditions in the
American labor market).
The FAM generally permits the start-up essential employees of an enterprise a
stay of one to two years. FAM, supra note 6, at 89, note 13.3-1; see, FRAGOMEN ET
AL., supra note 9, § 3.2(e) (stating that the duration of stay for start-up personnel, as
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standard in evaluating the essentiality element by using a set of general
factors rather than a clear definition for essentiality."' The FAM also
specifies that the essential employee need not have prior work experi-
ence with the treaty employer, unless the employee can only acquire
skills through previous employment."'
I. COMPARISON OF STATE DEPARTMENT
AND INS PROPOSED RULES
Historically, the INS accorded great deference to the State Department
on the rules and interpretations of the E-2 visa."3 The landmark case
of In re Walsh and Pollard,"4 however, demonstrates the disagreement
between the INS and the State Department concerning their views on
a rule of thumb, lasts for one year); Miller, supra note 21, at 836 (stating that essen-
tial treaty employees who receive an E-2 visa based on their familiarity with overseas
operation, are authorized to stay for a one-year period). The State Department desig-
nated start-up essential employees as "TDY" (temporary duty), whose visa cannot be
revalidated in the United States. GORDON ET AL., supra note 3, § 17. The "TDY"
designation within the agreement between the treaty employee and the issuing post
signals that their stay is limited to one year. Id.
111. See FAM, supra note 6, at 88-89, note 13.3-2 (listing general factors to be
considered in evaluating the element of essentiality).
In assessing the degree of specialization and the essentiality of the skills, the
set of factors to be considered include: 1) the degree of expertise; 2) the uniqueness
of the skills; 3) the duties; 4) the compensation; and 5) the availability of United
States workers. Id. Language skills alone will not otherwise classify an employee as a
specialized and essential skill employee. GORDON ET AL., supra note 3, § 17.04(3).
To establish that an employee possesses these skills, the treaty employee must
present evidence of proper training andlor experience. FAM, supra note 6, at 89, note
13.3-2; Goldstein, supra note 20, at 201-02. Finally, the consular officer will examine
the time period of such training and the level of experience the employee has to
determine the duration of essentiality. FAM, supra note 6, at 89, note 13.3-2.
112. FAM, supra note 6, at 89, note 13.3-4.
113. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing the authority the State
Department has in determining E-I and E-2 eligibility requirements). This authority
exists because the negotiation and interpretation of BITs, the prerequisite to the issu-
ance of an E-2 visa, remains within the sole authority of the State Department. Id.
Further, the treaty investor can apply exclusively through a United States consulate
abroad without prior approval by the INS. Klasko, supra note 23, at 1418; Yanni,
supra note 1, at 3. The INS, in a few cases, will adjudicate E-2 matters only when
it receives an application for an extension of E status or for a change of nonimmi-
grant status. Klasko, supra note 23, at 1418.
114. See In re Walsh and Pollard, Interim Dec. No. 3111, 1988 BIA LXIS 55,
at 136 (1988) (analyzing the elements of a substantial investment).
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the visa."' As a result of this case, and at the request of many field
offices, the INS proposed its own regulations for the E-2 visa."6 The
State Department proposed its own rules to define "substantial" pursuant
to the congressional order."7 Additionally, it proposed rules to codify
the FAM interpretative notes. "'
During the past four years in which the two sets of proposed rules
have been pending,"9 immigration practitioners have expressed a gen-
eral concern that these rules, particularly those of the INS, will impose
more stringent requirements upon the treaty investors than the current
regulations,' 2 and thus, substantially limit the utility of the E-2 visa to
115. See id. (illustrating the disagreement between the State Department regulations
and the INS on the issues of substantiality of investment and the role of treaty em-
ployees). The Board of Immigration Appeals gave weight to the State Department
regulations and the INS history of accorded deference. Id. at 182-83. The Board of
Immigration Appeals stated that "if the [INS] disagrees with the regulations of the
[State Department], it should take advantage of the existing mechanisms of inter-agen-
cy consultation to convince the [State Department] to change its regulations." Id.
116. See INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,952-53 (stating that many INS field
offices requested publication of INS E-2 regulations instead of consulting the FAM);
Klasko, supra note 23, at 1418 (stating that INS newly proposed E visa regulations
can be traced to the Walsh and Pollard decision).
The current INS regulations on E-2 classification merely consists of two para-
graphs briefly addressing the issues of the treaty alien's duration, extension of stay,
and change of employer. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(e) (1993). The INS Operations Instructions
also provide very limited guidance on the issues of treaty employees and dependents
of treaty aliens. INS OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 23, § 214.2(e). In fact, it
directs INS examiners to consult the FAM interpretative notes on E matters. Id.
117. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing the State Department's
authority to define the substantiality requirement).
118. DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,565 (Summary) (providing a brief de-
scription of those who can obtain E classification); see 22 C.F.R. § 41.51 (describing
the classification of treaty trader, treaty investor, treaty employee, dependents of treaty
alien, representatives of foreign information media, and classification of Canadian and
Mexican nationals as relating to labor disputes). The interpretative notes of the FAM
contain most of the rules governing the adjudication of E-2 visas. See FAM, supra
note 6, at 81-89, notes 1-14 (providing the relevant requirements and tests to deter-
mine E classification).
119. See Interview with Cornelius D. Scully and H. Edward Odom, supra note 11
(stating that the State Department's final regulations have subsequently been approved
by the OMB and signed by the Assistant Secretary). The State Department's final
regulations will be published simultaneously with the INS final regulations. Publication
has been delayed due to staff shortage and other bureaucratic problems. Id.
120. See FRAGOMEN ET AL., supra note 9, § 3.2(e) (warning that the INS pro-
posals on essential employees could impose new restrictions on admission).
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well-qualified foreign investors.' In a recent interview with State De-
partment Visa Office officials, the officials stated that during an infor-
mal agency meeting several years ago, the two agencies resolved the
differences of the proposed rules.'" Therefore, the State Department's
proposed rules, which largely codify the FAM notes, " will be the
prevailing rules. 4
Unfortunately, the apparent language differences of these two sets of
proposed rules could easily lead to inconsistent and contradictory adjudi-
cations of E-2 visa requirements.'" Moreover, INS current application
121. See Klasko, supra note 23, at 1417, 1419 (stating that the proposed regula-
tions could restrict the usefulness of the E visa and that the language and substantive
differences between the two sets of rules are problematic); FRAGOMEN ET AL., supra
note 9, § 3.2(e) (advising treaty employers to qualify treaty employees at United
States consulates abroad to take advantage of the State Department's less stringent
regulations, as the INS may already be applying its own more stringent proposed
rules ).
122. Interview with Cornelius D. Scully and H. Edward Odom, supra note 11
(stating that regardless of the stylistic and linguistic differences between the two agen-
cies' rules, the substance of the two final rules will largely be the same).
To ensure uniformity in the adjudication of E-2 visas, the State Department has
agreed to act as an "informal consultant" to INS officers, after rejecting the INS
request for field officers to seek the formal State Department advisory opinion for
future guidance. ld. To keep these future consultations between the two agencies as
informal as possible, the two agencies will probably be communicating by telephone
or fax. Id. The State Department officials are also hoping, in the future, to link its
vast E-mail system that connects with the majority of its posts overseas with the INS
E-mail network in order to establish on-line immediate access. Id.
123. Id. The preamble emphasized that the proposed rules merely reiterated the
State Department's current policy regarding treaty investors and retained the flexible
approach toward the adjudication of E-2 visas. See DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at
43,566 (emphasizing that the proposed rules do not raise new concepts and that the
State Department has rejected replacing the exercise of judgment with bright-line tests
in consideration of the ever changing nature of the business industry and its need for
flexibility and adaptability).
124. See Interview with Cornelius D. Scully and H. Edward Odom, supra note 11
(stating that the INS acceptance of the State Department's position possibly resulted
from the change of INS staff over the past few years).
125. See Klasko, supra note 23, at 1417, 1419 (stating that the material linguistic
and substantive differences between the two sets of proposed rules are problematic
because they could result in inconsistent E-2 adjudications); see also Theodore
Ruthizer, Update From the Immigration and Naturalization Services Recent Develop-
ment in the L-1, F-i, E-lIE-2 Visa Categories, in 25TH ANNUAL IMMIGRATION AND
NATURA.ZATION INSTrrTE 9 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Prac. Course Handbook Series
No. 9, 1992) (stating that the dramatic differences and conflicts between the two sets
of proposed rules have caused much controversy).
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of some of its proposed rules'26 necessitates an analysis of the pro-
posed rules, as one set of the rules may provide more favorable eligibil-
ity requirements for the foreign investor than the other.
The remainder of this section will compare the INS and State Depart-
ment proposed rules as the basis of formatting definitions of the statuto-
ry requirements of nationality, active and substantial investment, and
roles of the employer and employee.
A. FORMAT AND DEFINITIONS
Both sets of the proposed regulations provide a list of basic defini-
tions "'27 which substantially parallel each other, and closely follow the
definitions in the current State Department regulations.' Both versions
proceed to address regulations in the similar general order of nationality,
substantial and active investment, role of the employer, and role of the
employee.'29
The INS version, however, organizes its regulations by such categories
as definitions, admission, classification criteria, and duration, which
126. See FRAGOMEN ET AL., supra note 9, § 3.2(e) (warning that recent applica-
tions decided by the INS indicate that it is applying its proposed rules on essential
treaty employees in the adjudication process).
127. See INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,952, 42,954-55 (defining applicant,
employee treaty alien, primary treaty alien, trade, treaty alien, treaty company, and
treaty country); DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,565, 43,569-70 (defining treaty
trader, treaty investor, employee and dependents of treaty aliens, and representatives of
foreign information media).
128. DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,569-70. The State Department's version
virtually mirrors its current definitions. Id. Although, it adds the phrase "in the posi-
tion to develop and direct the enterprise" into the definition for "treaty investor"
possibly for the reason of placing emphasis on the importance of such role. Id. The
State Department's version also omits the labor dispute provision found in the current
State Department regulations. Id; see 22 C.F.R. § 41.51 (providing the general labor
dispute provision).
The INS version groups E-I and E-2 visaholders as "treaty aliens." INS Pro-
posal, supra note 12, at 42,954. Unlike the current and proposed State Department
regulations, the INS version also specifically distinguishes a primary treaty alien from
an employee treaty alien and provides a separate definition for treaty company. Id;
see 22 C.F.R. § 41.51 (defining separately, treaty trader and treaty investor and plac-
ing provisions of primary treaty alien and treaty company under the employee treaty
alien definition). The INS definitions, however, parallel those found in the current and
proposed State Department regulations. INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,569-70.
129. INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,952-55; DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at
43,565-66.
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make interpretation of regulations easier and more orderly than the State
Department regulations." The State Department's proposed rule sets
forth the E-2 requirements entirely in the definitional format without
distinguishing the requirements from its tests or elements.' This meth-
od results in an overwhelming number of issues to be considered equal-
ly and simultaneously in the adjudication of E visas."
B. NATIONALITY
Regarding the subject of the nationality requirement, both sets of the
proposed rules reiterate the FAM notes.' The INS version incorpo-
rates substantially more detail from the notes than does the State Depart-
ment version."3 The incorporation of FAM notes will facilitate consis-
tency in the adjudications of E-2 visas by both agencies because it
requires the INS officers to abide by the FAM notes which the consul-
ate officers follow strictly. 5
C. AcrivE INVESTmENT
The two versions concur with each other and with the FAM notes in
regard to the "active investment" requirement." The State Department
130. INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,954-57.
131. See DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,569-90 (providing definitions for the
E-2 requirements, tests, and elements, but not differentiating among their relative func-
tions and importance). For instance, the Proposal merely defines treaty country and
nationality of the treaty country in two separate paragraphs. Id.
132. DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,565.
133. Klasko, supra note 23, at 1422 (stating that no significant differences exist
between the proposed rules and the current regulations on the issue of nationality).
Compare DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,566 (requiring that the treaty alien be
of the nationality of the treaty country) and INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,955
(requiring the treaty alien or employer to possess the nationality of the treaty country)
with FAM, supra note 6, at 81-82, note 3 (stating the same criterion).
134. Compare INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,955 (stating INS adoption of
both the FAM 'Tfifty-percent" rule and the "place of incorporation" provision) with
DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,570 (expressing the State Department's re-
statement of FAM's general introduction on the nationality requirement and placing
emphasis on tracing the ownership of a corporation).
135. See Goldstein, supra note 24, at 158 (illustrating the extent to which the
consuls adhere to the FAM by referring to the FAM as the "Consuls' Bible").
136. Klasko, supra note 23, at 1420 (stating that the proposed regulations on what
constitutes an active investment are relatively consistent with the current rules). Com-
pare INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,955 (requiring that the investment be in a
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version codifies all of the elements of an "active investment" described
in the FAM notes.
37
By contrast, the INS proposed regulations eliminate the FAM element
of "possession and control" of funds from the active investment require-
ment. 3 The INS proposal adds research facilities and market research
to the State Department's list of examples of idle speculative investment,
thus unreasonably limiting the number and scope of qualifying enterpris-
es.
139
The INS and State Department failed to draft regulations for the cur-
rent FAM notes explaining what constitutes "irrevocably committed."'"
This omitted note permits investment conditioned upon the issuance of
the E-2 visa and requires merely that the applicant be close to the start
of the operations and not already engaged in the actual operations. 4'
The omission of this note will narrow the active investment requirement
unreasonably because few foreign investors would desire to take the risk
by making substantial investment in the United States without a visa
guarantee.
real business enterprise which produces goods or services) with DOS Proposal, supra
note 12, at 43,570 (stating that the enterprise must be a real and active one that
produces goods or services for profit) and FAM, supra note 6, at 83, note 5
(containing the same requirement).
137. See DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,570 (codifying the three elements of
"possession and control," "irrevocably committed," and "risk" in the proposed "invest-
ment" provision and almost copying the entire introductory notes on enterprise into
the proposed provision of "bona fide enterprise"); see also FAM, supra note 6, at 83-
84, note 7.1 (enumerating these elements).
138. See INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,955 (incorporating the elements of
"irrevocably committed," "bona fide enterprise," and "risk" into its proposed provision
of "real operating enterprise").
139. Compare INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,955 (offering these examples)
with DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,570 (omitting these examples).
140. Compare FAM, supra note 6, at 84, note 7.1-3 (defining the term "irrevoca-
bly committed") with DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,570 (failing to define the
term) and INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,955 (failing also to define the term).
141. FAM, supra note 6, at 84, note 7.1-3; see Yanni, supra note 1, at 5 (sug-
gesting that the State Department proposed regulations should clarify that the applicant
does not necessarily have to be in the actual operation of the business and can be in
the process of investing); Klasko, supra note 23, at 1421 (recommending the adoption
of the FAM provision that declares applications acceptable pending upon the issuance
of the visa).
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D. SUBSTANTIAL INVESTMENT
The two sets of proposed rules and the current law resemble each
other on the subject of substantial investment.' 2 The State Department
promulgates into regulations the two tests of substantiality established in
the FAM.' 3 The State Department, however, does not adopt the lan-
guage of "no minimum dollar amount" in defiming the scope of the
meaning of "substantial."" Instead, it provides a brief definition for
"substantial amount of capital.""'
The INS version adds two tests to the substantiality requirement by
incorporating the elements of "direction and development" ''  and "real
operating enterprise."'" This addition, however, does not change the
current law. The INS merely merges the requirements of active and
substantial investment and the role of the employer into one requirement
entitled "substantial investment," and the content of these elements does
not vary greatly from that of the FAM.'" The INS version, however,
142. See Klasko, supra note 23, at 1421 (stating that the two proposed rules are
consistent with each other on the issue of substantiality of investment). Compare INS
Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,955 (requiring that the investor direct and develop a
real enterprise, that the investment constitute a "significant proportion" of the
business' starting cost, and that said business be more than "marginal") and DOS
Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,570 (employing nearly identical criteria) with FAM. su-
pra note 6, at 85-86, notes 9. 10 (providing the same criteria). But see Bastone,
supra note 24, at 211 (stating that a potential inconsistency could arise in applying
the proportionality test when the State Department defines enterprise "value" as the
"purchase price" and the INS defines it as the "total value of the business," which
allows more discretion).
143. DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,570. The preamble explains that the
flexible approach applied to these tests was retained because of congressional consent
to the State Department interpretation of substantial investment and to foster the goal
of the BIT, which is to have a flexible standard to encourage mutual investment and
to accommodate all business sizes. Id. at 43,567-68.
144. Id.
145. See id. (stating that a "[a] substantial amount of capital constitutes that
amount which is sufficiently ample to ensure the investor's financial commitment to
the successful operation of the enterprise as measured by the proportionality test").
146. See INS Proposes E Visa Regulations, supra note 23, at 1114 (listing the
four tests to be satisfied under the INS "substantial investment" requirement). Com-
pare INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,955 (including these two tests) with FAM,
supra note 6, at 85, note 9 (explaining substantiality without using these tests).
147. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (analyzing the substantial invest-
ment requirement of the INS Proposal and comparing it with the FAM).
148. Compare INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,955 (including these two ele-
ments in the merged section) with FAM, supra note 6. at 84-86. notes 8. 11 (ex-
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restricts the substantiality requirement by adding the word "significant"
to the proportionality test. 49
The two agencies seem to have compromised in uniformly modifying
the FAM examples concerning conduct which could constitute "substan-
tial."'50 The INS demonstrates its bright-line test policy in its creation
of broader categories of business values,' higher minimum percentag-
es,152 and more stringent language in its requirements.'53 The State
Department maintains its flexibility approach by continuing to insist that
the examples are not rigid bright-line tests,'54 but mere presumptions
of substantiality.'55
Several problems may arise from the newly created examples on the
inverted sliding scale. As compared to the examples in the FAM notes,
the agencies used more rigid and conclusive language, 5 which one
could easily construe as setting a minimum standard to be met in evalu-
plaining these requirements separately).
149. See INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,955 (requiring that the investment be
a "significant" proportion of the enterprise's total value); see also FAM, supra note 6,
at 85, note 9 (using the "proportionality" test, but declining to explicitly require that
the proportion be "significant").
150. FRAGOMEN ET AL., supra note 9, § 3.2; 56 Fed. Reg. 42,567-68; 56 Fed.
Reg. 42,955.
151. Compare DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,570 and INS Proposal, supra
note 12, at 42,955 (setting the dividing amounts for the three categories of business
values as $500,000 and $3,000,000) with FAM, supra note 6, at 85, note 9.3 (setting
the dividing amount for the six examples of business values as $50,000, $100,000,
$500,000, $1 million, $10 million, and $100,000 million).
152. Compare DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,570 and INS Proposal, supra
note 12, at 42,955 (requiring minimum investments of 75% for an enterprise costing
less than $500,000, 50% for one costing more than $500,000 but not exceeding a
$3,000,000 cost, and 30% for one costing more than $3,000,000) with FAM, supra
note 6, at 85, note 9.3 (stating that the investment percentages of 90-100, 75-100, 60,
50-60, 30, 10 would meet the "substantiality test").
153. Compare INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,955 (using the words "minimum
percentage of investment required" in the examples) (emphasis added) with supra note
78 and accompanying text (citing FAM examples that function only as general guide-
lines).
154. See INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,955 (stating that applying the inverted
sliding scale as a rigid, bright-line test contravenes its purpose); Klasko, supra note
23, at 1421 (stating that the scale serves as a guideline, not as a conclusive test).
155. DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,570.
156. Compare id. at 43,567 (emphasizing what "would" qualify instead of what
"might" qualify) and INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,955 (showing percentages
that are likely to suffice) with FAM, supra note 6, at 85, note 9.3 (stressing that
given figures "might" qualify).
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ating substantiality." Second, the agencies set an extremely broad
range of the business cost amount within each of the three examples on
the inverted sliding scale."" For example, a seventy-five percent in-
vestment in an enterprise worth $50,000 differs tremendously from a
seventy-five percent investment in another estimated at $500,000. Such
broad requirements pose a substantial disadvantage to smaller businesses,
which contradict the preamble's stated goal of accommodating all busi-
ness sizes by maintaining flexibility and exercising sound judgment.5
The two sets of proposed regulations offer differing interpretations of
the "marginality tests." The INS version more stringently construes the
marginality test. For example, the creation of job opportunities or the
showing of a positive economic impact alone would not satisfy its mar-
ginality test. W The State Department, however, would not consider an
enterprise that makes a significant economic impact as marginal, even if
the return does not significantly exceed the living costs.' 6'
Other than this conflict, the two sets of proposed rules impose similar
restrictions to the FAM notes on marginality. They both require the
return to be "significantly" greater than subsistence.'" Neither set of
proposed rules, however, considers other additional sources of income or
assets in the determination of marginality. Finally, they both shift
the focus of the test from the individual investor (return and other as-
sets) to the enterprise (job creation and positive economic impact)."
157. Kiasko, supra note 23, at 1421.
158. See DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,570 (measuring the percentage of in-
vestment required by the total value of a business or the total cost to start a new
business); INS Proposal, supra note 12 at 42,955 (following the same measurements
as the State Department).
159. Yanni, supra note 1, at 7; see Ruthizer, supra note 125, at 9 (describing the
high-figured requirements as unusually harsh).
160. INS Proposes E Visa Regulations, supra note 23, at 1114-15 (citing 56 Fed.
Reg. 42,955-56 (1991)).
161. State Dept. Proposes E Visa Revisions, 68 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1151,
1152 (Sept. 9, 1991) (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 43,570 (1991)).
162. Compare DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,570 (declaring the "significantly
greater than subsistence" requirement) and INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,956
(providing the same standard) with FAM, supra note 6, at 86, note 10 (stating that
the alien must intend and prove that the enterprise will earn more than a mere living
for the alien's family).
163. Compare DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,570 (declining to mention the
factors of additional sources of income or assets to evaluate the investment) and INS
Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,956 (declining also to mention these same factors) with
FAM, supra note 6, at 86, note 10 (ignoring the two factors altogether).
164. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (discussing how both sets of pro-
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E. ROLE OF THE EMPLOYER: To DEVELOP AND DIRECT
No significant difference exists between the INS and State Department
proposed rules on the role of the treaty employer." The two versions
codify the FAM notes on the "develop and direct" requirement.' The
agencies agree on the FAM's methods of obtaining control by greater
than fifty-percent ownership, fifty-percent ownership in a joint venture
or equal partnership if the investor retains veto power or negative con-
trol, and by less than fifty-percent ownership if the investor possesses de
facto control.'67
The difference in choice of words again may result in different inter-
pretations of the rules. First, a discrepancy exists between the two pro-
posed regulations on whether the investor possesses control by simply
having fifty-percent ownership or whether the investor must have a
minimum of fifty-one percent ownership.' Second, the State Depart-
ment version contains the words "in the position" to develop and direct,
while the INS version follows the statute by requiring "solely" to devel-
op and direct."6 The INS proposal uses more restrictive language be-
cause the investor must only engage in the actual developing and di-
recting of the enterprise. 7 ° This language is problematic because one
posed rules require the return to be significant).
165. See Bastone, supra note 24, at 209 (stating that both the INS and State
Department agree on the subject of "direct and develop").
166. DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,570 (explaining similarity between the
two proposed rules and FAM regarding marginality); INS Proposal, supra note 12, at
42,955; see Klasko, supra note 23, at 1422 (recognizing the consistency between the
two proposed rules and FAM on the subject of marginality).
167. INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,955 (explaining that the applicant bears
the burden of controlling investment); DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,570 (stating
that if the individual investor stands in a position to control the enterprise, that inves-
tor stands in a position to "develop and direct").
168. Compare INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,955 (requiring more than 50%
ownership) with DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,570 (retaining the FAM language
of control requiring at least 50% of the business); see FRAGOMEN ET AL., supra note
9, § 3.2(e) (stating that equal shares of ownership in a joint venture alone may not
satisfy the "develop and direct" requirement in the proposed rule).
169. See Klasko, supra note 23, at 1423 (stating that the intention to distinguish
may or may not be purposeful, but could be problematic). Compare DOS Proposal,
supra note 12, at 43, 570 (requiring the investor to occupy a position in which he or
she can develop and direct the enterprise) with INS proposal, supra note 12, at
42,955 (retaining the statutory language of "solely to direct and develop the opera-
tions").
170. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (comparing the DOS and INS
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interpretation could be denying the treaty investor the right to engage in
other necessary incidental activities."" On the other hand, the language
in the State Department's proposal focuses on the exercise of authority
and control, not necessarily the act of directing and developing."
F. ROLE OF THE EMPLOYEE: ExECuTVE
AND SUPERVISORY/MANAGERIAL
The State Department and INS proposed rules agree with each other
on the subject of the executive or supervisory/managerial employee."
The proposed rules maintain and expand on the current FAM notes on
the executive employee by providing a favorable position descrip-
tion, focusing on the employee's managerial function. 7" The INS
version codifies the set of factors found in the FAM while the State De-
partment incorporates only some of these factors into its position de-
scription."' The agencies' use of different terms of "supervisory" and
"managerial" could unnecessarily create future inconsistent interpretations."
proposed requirement for the investor's directing and developing responsibility).
171. Id.
172. Klasko, supra note 23, at 1423.
173. INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,956 (discussing the importance of pos-
sessing managerial skills and experience); DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,570
(discussing the importance of possessing executive or supervisory skills).
174. See INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,956 (stating that the primary respon-
sibilities should be making decisions, setting policies, directing operations, and perhaps
supervising higher level personnel); DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,570 (stating
that an executive should set policy and enterprise direction, while a supervisory em-
ployee oversees a company's major component).
175. See Klasko, supra note 23, at 1423 (explaining the similarity between the
INS and the State Department definitions of executive or supervisory/managerial em-
ployee and the more liberal 1990 Act definitions in comparison to those of the L-1
regulations). But see Bastone, supra note 24, at 197 (noting functional equivalence of
INS and L-1 definition of "executive"). Both proposed rules do not require supervi-
sion of any employees and would accept product or project managers as executive or
supervisory/managerial employees. Id.
176. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (discussing the subject of supervi-
sory/managerial employee); see also Yarmi, supra note 1, at 16 (stating that the State
Department rejected the proposal to replace its flexible standards with the restrictive
definitions of managerial and executive capacity of the 1990 Act).
177. See Klasko, supra note 23, at 1423 n.28 (providing that the term "executive"
when used in conjunction with the terms "supervisory" or "managerial" may or may
not have the same meanings); see also Bastone, supra note 24, at 196-97 (stating that
the INS uses the terms "executive" and "managerial" interchangeably, while the State
Department distinguishes the terms "executive" and "supervisory" and uses them in a
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G. ROLE OF THE EMPLOYEE: ESSENTIAL
The provision on the role of the essential employee of the proposed
rules stands as the main source of disputes between the two agen-
cies.'78 The two sets of proposed regulations vary significantly in their
assessment of "essential" and their specific requirements for the employ-
ers of the essential employees.79 The State Department adopts the set
of factors found in the FAM notes for evaluation of the specialized and
essential qualities of the employee's skills. 80 The State Department
omits the factor dealing with the availability of United States work-
ers. 8 ' The INS not only codifies the same set of FAM factors, but al-
so requires that the employee has specialized knowledge or unique
skills, 18 a responsible position, and a high level of expertise or propri-
etary knowledge of the operations." 3 Unlike the State Department, the
INS places a greater emphasis on the factor of availability of United
States workers.'84
Another conflict between the two sets of proposed regulations derives
from the additional requirements both agencies impose upon the essential
employees.' The INS and State Department both shift the focus from
proof of the length of time that the employer needs the employee's
essential skill, to proof of the employer's efforts to replace the
employee.'86 For example, the State Department would issue the E-2
broader sense).
178. See Klasko, supra note 23, at 1419 (stating that the agencies' proposed provi-
sions on the "essential employee" present a major substantive conflict); Bastone, supra
note 24, at 200 (stating that this proposed provision has probably stirred the most
controversies).
179. See Klasko, supra note 23, at 1419-20 (analyzing the difference between the
proposed rules on the aspect of essential employee); INS Proposal, supra note 12, at
42,956 (discussing the need for responsible capacity and independent judgment); DOS
Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,570 (discussing the importance of unique skills and
degree of proven expertise).
180. DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,570.
181. Id.
182. See Ruthizer, supra note 125, at 8 (stating that the requirement of specialized
knowledge or unique skills derives from L-I visa); see also Bastone, supra note 24,
at 198 (explaining the removal of L-1 factors: "proprietary knowledge," unique skills,"
and "readily available in the United States labor market," due to counter-productivity).
183. INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,956. Responsible capacity requires inde-
pendent judgment, creativity, training or supervision of other workers. Id.
184. Id.
185. See supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing the conflicting provi-
sions of the proposed rules in regard to the term "essential employee").
186. DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,570 (explaining the importance of dem-
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visa if the treaty investor could show either that the "eventual replace-
ment [of a long-term employee] by a United States worker is not feasi-
ble or that the [treaty] employer is making reasonable good faith efforts
to recruit and/or train [the] United States workers [as short-term employ-
ees]."'87
On the other hand, the INS inserted the strict labor certification
test" into its treaty investor proposed rule. The proposed rule places
an affirmative duty on the employer, at the time of the essential
employee's visa application, to show the unavailability of qualified Unit-
ed States workers' 9 and, at the time of application for a visa exten-
sion, to show efforts of in-house training." Furthermore, it also pre-
sumes the transferability of all skills, which directly contradicts the State
Department's view that some skills do not readily transfer and may
remain essential indefinitely.' In essence, the INS improperly applies
the stricter requirements for nonimmigrant H and L visas" to E-2 visas."
onstrating an effort to train United States workers for positions); INS Proposal, supra
note 12, at 42,956 (explaining the lack of feasibility in replacing alien employees
with United States workers).
187. DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,570 (explaining the importance of dem-
nnr,' supra- nrt- L:' .&i V kprimiv 1A- pprmupl T~1rP mp.d9= iiteej.base
rit ta- tJirn iAtds - wurirs. .
iee INA 212(a)(5)(A)(i) (stating that an alien is not permitted to enter the "' -- -
tes for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor unless the De-
f Labor determines that no available qualified United States workers exist
mployment will not adversely affect wages or working conditions of United
cers).
IS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,956 (discussing the consideration of Unit-
workers with similar training and expertise); Yanni, supra note 1, at 18
that the treaty investor should prepare to initiate training programs to
Lployees with essential skills); see Ruthizer, supra note 125, at 7 (stating
qS has dramatically changed the current law on the "essential employee"
t); INS Proposes E Visa Regulations, supra note 23, at 1115 (illustrating
2oint with regards to the INS treatment of "essential employees"); see also
Proposes E Visa Revisions, supra note 161, at 1152 (stating that the INS
ule applies the test under the L-1 intra-company transferee classification to
ssential employee" classification). -
!e supra note 189 and accompanying text (discussing the stringent INS re-
for essential employees).
IS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,956 (stating that "[a]ll skills are consid-
erable except in unusual circumstances").
IA § 101(a)(15)(H),(L).
!e INS Proposes E Visa Regulations, supra note 23, at 1115 (explaining the
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FINAL REGULATIONS
In providing recommendations for the final regulations on the E-2
classification, it is imperative to remember that Congress designed the
BIT to encourage foreign investments of all sizes in the United
States 194 and to protect and ensure equal treatment of United States
investors abroad. One should also remember that the E-2 classification
aims to stimulate the United States economy through successful invest-
ment operations."" In view of these principles and the traditionally in-
dependent nature of the consular's work," consular officers, as the
primary adjudicators of E-2 visa applications, should retain the flexible
approach by the exercise of sound judgment on a case-by-case basis."9
The need for rigid bright-line tests and stringent requirements may be
explained by the administrative need to have consistency in the adju-
dication of E-2 visas;' 9 by the goal of protecting United States work-
ers;"9 and by its duty to ensure that the applicant has met the statuto-
ry requirements and is not avoiding the immigrant visa numerical limita-
tions.' The creation of these strict requirements, however, could easi-
similarities between the INS requirements for an E-2 employee and the requirements
for an intra-company transferee); State Dept. Proposes E Visa Revisions, supra note
161, at 1153 (quoting Paul Schmidt, former Acting INS General Counsel, explaining
the more restrictive nature of the INS rules, particularly with respect to the essential
employee requirement, as compared to the State Department's proposed rules); see
also Klasko, supra note 23, at 1420 (noting INS misguided attempt to apply H or L
visa requirements to an E-2 visa created potential confusion).
194. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing the origin of the BIT).
195. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (noting beneficial purpose of the E
visa on United States economy by attracting foreign investments); DOS Proposal,
supra note 12, at 43,568 (stating that Congress drafted the BIT with a degree of
flexibility to allow the participation of enterprises of all sizes and that the proposed
rule will adhere to the purpose of the BIT); FAM, supra note 6, at I, note 1 (re-
minding consulars that the purpose of the BIT is to encourage commercial interaction
between the United States and the treaty nation).
196. See Yanni, supra note 1, at 1-2 (explaining that the consular's historical need
for independence in visa adjudication stems from the distance and poor communica-
tions between the consulate offices and the State Department).
197. See Interview with Cornelius D. Scully and H. Edward Odom, supra note 11
(stating that the final regulations will retain the flexible approach, particularly on the
substantiality requirement).
198. See id. (stating that the potential review of INS adjudications requires that
the INS use easily defensible, bright-line rules for possible litigation).
199. See INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,954 (stating when the INS determines
the qualifications of essential employees, the agency places great weight on the factor
of employment opportunities for United States workers).
200. See Myers and Thompson, supra note 21, at 3-4 (discussing the INA numeri-
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ly discourage foreign investments in the United States and ultimately
defeat the purpose of the treaty and E-2 visa classification. The small to
medium-sized enterprises, which constitute the majority of E-2 invest-
ments,"° probably would not have ample resources to meet the rigid
requirements.' Moreover, the treaty nations could, in turn, impose
similarly stringent requirements upon United States investors abroad, pre-
senting obstacles to the expansion of United States investment.,
In order to achieve its objective successfully, the E-2 visa require-
ments must accommodate the needs of foreign investors,' correspond
to modem business realities,' and treat foreign investors the same
way as the treaty countries are treating the United States investors
abroad. Otherwise, like the immigrant investor visa, the E-2 visa
could fail to accomplish its stated purpose because of the unrealistically
difficult requirements.'
cal limits).
201. See Goldstein, supra note 20, at 128 (stating relatively small size of most
E-2 investments, such as grocery stores and restaurants); Grunblatt et al., supra note
3, at 85 (recognizing the relatively small size of many E-2 enterprises); see also DOS
Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,568 (noting the modem increase in service-oriented
businesses often established with less than S100,000); Yanni, supra note 1, at 7 (stat-
ing that unlike past investments in manufacturing, most new investors make E-2 in-
vestments in service enterprises).
202. See Klasko, supra note 23, at 1424 (stating that small enterprises will not be
able to meet the new employee traininglreplacement requirement under the proposed
rule).
203. Interview with Michael Maggio, Immigration Law Practitioner and Adjunct
Professor for Immigration Law at the American University, Washington College of
Law, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 11, 1995) [hereinafter Interview with Michael
Maggio].
204. See supra note 203 and accompanying text (stating that the majority of E-2
businesses lack the capital to meet the new restrictive requirements).
205. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of
the term "irrevocably committed"). One example of modern business reality is the
investor's consideration of the chance of obtaining an E-2 visa when deciding whether
to make the investment. The risk of a visa rejection discourages an investor from
engaging in the operations. Therefore, the regulations should permit investments condi-
tioned upon the issuance of an E-2 visa.
206. See Interview with Michael Maggio, supra note 203 (stating that the possi-
bility of retaliatory action by treaty nations to counteract the stringent United States
requirement will impede Untied States investments abroad).
207. See generally Fertik, supra note 1, at 661-64 (concluding that the immigrant
investor program failed because Congress "overpriced" the visa and imposed burden-
some visa requirements, such as the required minimum number of jobs created, de-
tailed investment and disclosure requirements).
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To remain true to the objectives of the E-2 visa, the following recom-
mendations are suggested with regard to format and definitions, active
and substantial investment, and the roles of the employer and employee.
A. FORMAT AND DEFINITIONS
In the interest of uniformity and consistency in the interpretation of
E-2 requirements and the adjudication of E-2 visas, the two agencies'
final regulations should attempt to employ the same language if the
provisions are conceptually similar."°s Although a minor issue, the
agencies should organize the final regulations by statutory requirements,
with agency requirements and tests as subheadings. For example, the
regulations should list each of the statutory requirements discussed in
this Comment. Under the active investment requirement, for instance, the
regulations should discuss the elements of possession and control, irrevo-
cably committed funds, and risk. Such organization will allow easier and
speedier interpretation of the rules.
B. AcTIvE INVESTMENT
The final regulations should define the term "irrevocably committed"
by codifying the current FAM notes, specifically the provision allowing
investments conditioned upon the issuance of an E-2 visa2" and invest-
ments made close to the start of operations."0 The failure of the pro-
posed rules to explain this term may lead to a restrictive interpretation
of this requirement, thus limiting the E-2 visa to well-qualified inves-
tors."'
With the same considerations, the INS should also remove research
facilities and market research as examples of idle speculative invest-
208. See Klasko, supra note 23, at 1419 (illustrating that the language difference
between the two sets of proposed regulations will create conflicts in rule interpretation
and visa adjudication).
209. See id. at 1421 (stating that the proposed regulations' failure to provide secu-
rity to the investor, will discourage E-2 applications).
210. See Yanni, supra note 1, at 5 (suggesting incorporation of the language "in
the process of investing" to clarify that the business does not necessarily have to be
in actual operation, but merely close to the start of operation).
211. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (raising and explaining the
issue of the proposed regulations' failure to define the term "irrevocably committed").
As previously discussed, this omission may require the applicant to engage in the
actual operations at the time of application thereby excluding those investors who are
close to the start of business.
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ments because these enterprises can be active and profitable."' In fact,
such enterprises would benefit the United States through the infusion of
profitable knowledge and information." 3
C. SUBSTANTIAL INVESTMENT
The proposed rules do not state bright-line tests for substantial invest-
ment but rather provide examples demonstrating what presumptively
constitutes substantial investment. ' The agencies' choice of words,
however, which are more restrictive than those used in the current FAM
notes,"' could easily mislead the consulars into interpreting the exam-
ples as rigid minimum requirements.216 Thus, the final regulations
should adopt the FAM language that stresses "[n]o set dollar figure
constitutes a minimum amount of investment to be considered
'substantial""'21 in order to emphasize the use of flexible standards.
The elimination of the inverted sliding scale examples2 8 would be
the ideal flexible approach. In order to reach a compromise between the
State Department and INS, however, the final regulations will probably
retain the inverted sliding scale." 9 The final rules, therefore, should
212. See Klasko, supra note 23, at 1420 (stating that eliminating the problematic
examples added by the INS would be helpful). The author suggests that the INS
change its restrictive language from "speculative or idle investment" to "idle specula-
tive investment." Id.
213. Interview with Michael Maggio, supra note 203.
214. See DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,570 (noting that meeting the percent-
age requirements in the examples merely creates a presumption of substantiality). The
State Department emphasizes its adherence to the intent of the treaties in order to
maintain the flexibility to adapt to all business sizes. Id. at 43,567-68; see INS Pro-
posal, supra note 12, at 42,953, 42,955 (stating that the examples are not intended to
be a rigid bright-line test).
215. See supra notes 153, 156-57 and accompanying text (commenting on the lan-
guage used to determine substantiality).
216. See Yanni, supra note 1, at 7 (arguing that the proposed regulations' inverted
sliding scale may end up creating a bright-line test with very high minimum invest-
ment requirements); see also Klasko, supra note 23, at 1421 (warning that in applica-
tion, the examples could potentially become a bright-line test).
217. FAM, supra note 6, at 85, note 9.1.
218. See id. at 85, note 9.3 (discussing the inverted sliding scale and providing
examples).
219. Interview with Cornelius D. Scully and H. Edward Odom, supra note 11.
There is a slight possibility that the State Department may not incorporate the in-
verted sliding scale examples into its final regulations, but merely place them in the
preamble. Id. State Department officials also expressed the possibility that the exam-
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further divide the categories in the proposed regulations' examples," °
perhaps setting the percentage level as follows:
1. 90% for investments $100,000 and under;
2. 75% for investments over $100,000 and under $300,000;'
3. 60% for investments over $300,000 and under $500,000;'
4. 45% for investments over $500,000 and under $750,000;14
5. 30% for investments over $750,000 and under $1,000,0 00 ;'
6. 15% for investments above $1,000,000.26
This classification would maintain the goals of the E-2 visa and the
BIT by encouraging investments, and at the same time, by ensuring the
substantiality of such investments to stimulate the United States econo-
my successfully.
For the marginality test, because immigration practitioners suggest that
the proposed regulations require proof of capacity to generate in-
pIes would more closely follow the examples in the FAM notes and not those in the
proposed regulations. Id.
220. See Yanni, supra note 1, at 7 (criticizing the proposed regulations' inverted
sliding scale for setting high percentage figures which contradicts the preamble's stat-
ed goal of maintaining flexibility); see also Ruthizer, supra note 125, at 3 (discussing
the example's unusually harsh percentage requirements).
221. Compare this author's suggestion with INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,055
(requiring a minimum 75% investment in a business valued under $500,000) and DOS
Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,567 (requiring at least a 60% investment for firms
costing $500,000).
222. Compare this author's suggestion with INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,055
(requiring a minimum 75% investment in a business valued under $500,000) and DOS
Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,567 (requiring at least a 60% investment for firms
costing $500,000).
223. Compare this author's suggestion with INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,055
(requiring a minimum 75% investment in a business valued under $500,000) and DOS
Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,567 (requiring at least a 60% investment for firms
costing $500,000).
224. Compare this author's suggestion with INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,955
(requiring a 50% investment in businesses costing between $500,000 and $3,000,000)
and DOS proposal, supra note 12, at 43,567 (requiring an investment of 50-60% for
a $1,000,000 business).
225. Compare this author's suggestion with INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,955
(requiring a 50% investment in businesses costing between $500,000 and $3,000,000)
and DOS proposal, supra note 12, at 43,567 (requiring an investment of 50-60% for
a $1,000,000 business).
226. Compare this author's suggestion with INS proposal, supra note 12, at 42,955
and DOS Proposal, supra note 12, at 43,567 (requiring a 30% investment in business-
es valued at more than $3,000,000).
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come,' 7 the final regulations should also change the requirement of
proof of present economic impact to proof of capacity to make a posi-
tive economic impact.' The likely inability of a newly established
treaty enterprise to prove a present economic impact clearly necessitates
this change. 9
In addition, the final rules should continue to allow evidence of other
income or assets as proof to preclude a finding of marginality."
Hence, an applicant who demonstrates that the treaty enterprise may
generate a positive economic impact or additional income, would satisfy
the marginality test.
Lastly, the final regulations should provide a definition for, or a test
to determine, "normal living cost."' In order to remain consistent
with the flexible approach, the final regulations should use a subjective
reasonableness standard to evaluate a treaty investor's individual family
living expenses.23 This author suggests that a treaty enterprise passes
the marginality test as long as a treaty investor can demonstrate that his
or her family lives above the United States poverty line,' that the
earned income is sufficient to support the family,' and that he or she
will return to the treaty country in the event of a business failure.' 5
D. ROLE OF THE EMPLOYER: To DEVELOP AND DIRECT
In order to accomplish the goal of the visa classification and in the
interest of uniformity, the final regulations should require a minimum of
fifty percent ownership and not fifty-one percent' 5 Furthermore, the
227. See Klasko, supra note 23, at 1422 n.21 (recommending a revision of the
proposed rules to allow proof of capacity to produce a positive economic impact
because a newly formed enterprise will not initially be able to show such an impact).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See supra notes 84 and 164 and accompanying text (defiing and discussing
other income or assets).
231. See Goldstein, supra note 24, at 174 (anticipating a proposed rule provision
that will address the level of income that exceeds subsistence).
232. See FAM, supra note 6, at 86, note 10 (stating that the FAM allows proof
that the return from the enterprise exceeds normal living costs to pass the marginality
test but fails to provide standards or definition for the term "normal living cost").
233. But see FAM, supra note 6, at 86, note 10 (discussing the marginality test
and providing examples that demonstrate levels of subsistence).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (contrasting the control require-
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final regulations should not require an applicant to "solely" develop and
direct, as this would limit other activities in which the treaty investor
could necessarily or rightfully engage. 7 It would eliminate a unique
benefit that treaty investors enjoy and provide a disincentive to appli-
cants."3
E. ROLE OF THE EMPLOYEE: EXECUTIVE
AND SUPERVISORY/MANAGERIAL
In order to avoid an inconsistent interpretation of the rules, as a result
of differing interpretations of the terms "supervisory" and "manageri-
al,,,9 agencies should adopt the same word or include both words,
because they appear to be conceptually the same.Y
F. ROLE OF THE EMPLOYEE: ESSENTIAL
The INS proposed rule unrealistically expects that foreign investors
will be able to fulfill all of the current requirements, as well as satisfy
the stringent L-1 visa requirements. 241' As previously stated, most in-
vestments are for small to medium-sized businesses, which would not
ment in the State Department and INS proposals). The current FAM note only re-
quires ownership of at least 50%. FAM, supra note 6, at 86, note 11.1.
237. Interview with Cornelius D. Scully and H. Edward Odom, supra note 11. Al-
though the amount of ownership interest proves the element of "direct and develop,"
an alien should show that he or she "calls the shots" or has primary control. Id.
238. Cf. Klasko, supra note 23, at 1423 (regarding as immaterial the language
distinction because the INS proposal seems to require actual directing of the business
and the State Department proposal merely focuses on control); see also Yanni, supra
note 1, at 5 (questioning whether the INS proposed regulation may place restrictions
on an investor's incidental activities by requiring sole purpose to direct and develop).
239. See Yanni, supra note 1, at 16-17 (discussing the ambiguity of the INS use
of the term "managerial" because it requires possession of managerial skills (restric-
tive) and at the same time, does not require supervision of high-level personnel (re-
laxed)); see also Klasko, supra note 23, at 1423 n.28 (preferring the term "manageri-
al" because it does not require actual supervision).
240. The State Department describes "supervisory" as "granting the employer su-
pervisory responsibility for a large proportion of an enterprises' operations and ...
not involving the supervision of low-level employees." DOS proposal, supra note 12,
at 43,570. The INS definition of a "managerial or executive" employee is one "direct-
ing and managing business operations, and perhaps supervising other professional,
supervisory or managerial personnel." INS Proposal, supra note 12, at 42,956.
241. See Bastone, supra note 24, at 200 (arguing that the proposed changes to the
essential employee requirement impose an inappropriate cost and inconvenience on the
treaty employers, who are "invited" by the treaties to benefit the United States).
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have adequate resources to meet both the substantiality requirement and
the proposed essential employee training requirement. 2 The United
States should not require treaty investors, who are here pursuant to a
bilateral treaty to promote the United States national interest through
their substantial investment operations and creation of jobs, to provide
training for all essential employees who are assisting them in the opera-
tions of the enterprise.243 Other treaty countries do not impose similar
burdens upon United States investors abroad, who could easily qualify
United States employees. 2"
The State Department's proposed rule on this requirement presents an
appropriate compromise-to stimulate the economy through job creation
and protection and to encourage investments. Although this version is
not as optimally flexible as the current FAM notes,"' it ensures the
active recruitment of United States workers without imposing extra bur-
dens on employer treaty investors.
G. ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS
The treaty investor and the immigrant investor programs share the
common goal of promoting the United States economy through invest-
ment operations.2 With the exception of the immigrant investor
242. See Klasko, supra note 23, at 1424 (stating that the majority of the E-2
businesses would face financial difficulties in meeting the new rigid requirements).
243. See Kiasko, supra note 23, at 1420 (arguing that treaty investors should be
able to qualify responsible employees who help their investment operations, because
unlike H or L visaholders, E-2 visaholders have to satisfy the treaty and the substan-
tial investment requirements); see also Yanni, supra note 1, at 18 (suggesting that E
and L visaholders should be treated differently because the purposes of these clas-
sifications are very different).
244. See Interview with Michael Maggio, supra note 203.
245. As discussed, FAM requires that the treaty employer train replacement United
States workers within a reasonable time frame applies only to short-term, essential
employees. See supra note Ill and accompanying text (discussing the current FAM
replacement United States workers training requirement).
246. See Robert C. Groven, Note, Setting Our Sights: The United States and the
Canadian Investor Visa Programs, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 271, (1995) (specifying
the promotion of economic progress and the alleviation of poverty and unemployment
as the purposes of the Investor Visa Program); Fertik, supra note 1, at 650 (explain-
ing that Congress expected the Immigrant Investor Program to generate economic
growth); Lawrence C. Lee, Comment, The "Immigrant Entrepreneur" Provision of the
Immigration Act of 1990: Is a Single Entrepreneur Category Sufficient?, 12 JL &
CoM. 147 (1992) (indicating that proponents of the "immigrant entrepreneur provision
expected the measure to create jobs and contribute capital"); DOS Proposal, supra
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program's capital amount and job creation requirements,247 these two
programs also have very similar eligibility criteria.2"8
Critics contend that the immigrant investor program's capital amount
and job creation requirements contributed to the program's failure.249
note 12, at 43,567-68 (declaring that the purposes of E-2 visa classifications are to
stimulate the economy through investment operations and improve United States com-
mercial relationship).
247. See Fertik supra note 1, at 649 (discussing the investment amount require-
ments).
248. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (listing the statutory require-
ments for treaty investors); Groven, supra note 246, at 271 (citing INA § 203(5), 8
U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(1990)) (classifying the immigrant investor statutory requirements
to include qualified, engaging, new commercial enterprise, capital amount, job cre-
ation, and at risk).
In addition, the two investor programs have similar requirement with respect to
the role of the investor. See Yanni, supra note 1, at 20 (stating that the active/at risk
investment requirement is similar for immigrant and nonimmigrant investors in that
there must be lawful possession and control of irrevocably committed funds that are
placed at the investor's personal risk). The treaty investment, however, can be condi-
tional upon the issuance of an E-2 visa, whereas there is no such provision in the at
risk requirement for the immigrant investor. Id. Compare FAM, supra note 6, at 84,
note 7.1-3 (discussing the "irrevocably committed" element of the at risk requirement)
with Groven, supra note 246, at 280 n.75 (noting that an immigrant investor cannot
condition their enterprise contracts upon acceptance of their visa application).
In addition, the two investor programs are also similar with respect to the role
of the investor. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (stating that the treaty
investor must be primarily engaged in the direction and development of the enter-
prise); Groven, supra note 246, at 285 (noting that the immigrant investor must be
responsible for the daily operations of, and the decisions related to, the enterprise);
Lee, supra note 246, at 148 (stating that the immigrant investor must maintain an
active managerial role in the enterprise).
Both programs also exclude passive or nonprofit investment enterprises. See su-
pra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (discussing the treaty investor requirement of
an active investment in a qualifying enterprise); Yanni, supra note 1, at 20 (stating
that the immigrant investor's enterprise must be commercial and for profit).
Finally, the programs have similar definitions for "capital." See supra note 74
and accompanying text (stating that the treaty investor's qualifying funds are the
investor's assets in the enterprise that are placed at risk, including cash, equipment
and lease payments); Fertik, supra note 1, at 657 (stating that the immigrant
investor's capital includes cash, equipment, inventory, tangible and intangible property,
leases, and indebtedness secured by the alien's assets).
249. Cf. Fertik, supra note 1, at 661 (comparing the United States program with
its Canadian equivalent that has lower capital and job creation requirements); Groven,
supra note 246, at 274 (asserting that the price of the United States immigrant visa
remains unnecessarily high); Lee, supra note 246, at 149 (claiming that the high
capital requirement may exclude many skilled entrepreneurs who could otherwise
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Consequently, they recommend loosening the unrealistically high capital
and job creation requirements, and restructuring the program by separat-
ing the entrepreneur and investor aspects of the program.' Because
the high "risk" requirement often discourages potential applicants, others
recommend that the program should have an escape clause that permits
investment based upon the issuance of the permanent residency visa. Tm
The treaty investor program could be the model of a successfully
reformed immigrant investor program. m Congress or the authorized
agencies should provide the option to adjust status to permanent residen-
cy for the treaty investor who can demonstrate the fulfillment of the
goal of the program: continuous and substantial contribution to the Unit-
ed States economy.' They should, however, limit the provision to
principal individual treaty investors and not to treaty companies or em-
ployees.' To meet the element of substantial continuation, treaty in-
vestors could show a cumulative investment of a large sum of capital
(e.g., $250,000)'s and/or the direct or indirect creation of a number of
contribute to the United States economy).
250. See Groven, supra note 246, at 275 (recommending that the immigrant in-
vestor program could be reformed by expanding investment options, reducing at-risk
and capital requirements, and informing investors of tax policies). The author also
advocates creating two types of investor visas with distinct requirements to attract
both investors and entrepreneurs. Id; see also Fertik, supra note I, at 671 (proposing
a lowering of the capital threshold amount and job creation requirement, and creating
two investment options; investment and entrepreneurship); Lee, supra note 246, at 149
(arguing for the separation of the program into two categories, investors and entrepre-
neurs, in order to achieve the two distinct goals of the program).
251. See Groven, supra note 246, at 274 (proposing that the program permit im-
migrant investors to insert escape clauses into their contracts).
252. Ld. Because only nationals of the treaty nations and not every foreign inves-
tor, can avail themselves of the E-2 visa, the E-2 visa should not solve the defects
of the immigrant investor program because it would restrict the number of qualifying
foreign investors who could satisfy the economic goal of the program. Id. at 148-49.
The program however, should provide treaty investors with the option to adjust status
to permanent residency if they achieve the goal of the immigrant investor program.
Id.
253. See supra note 246 and accompanying text (citing economic growth as a
primary purpose of the immigrant investor program).
254. Groven, supra note 246, at 149. Clearly, companies cannot obtain permanent
residency status and treaty employees lack the required capital to make a substantial
contribution to the United States economy. Id.
255. See id. at 150 (suggesting lowering the capital requirement to S100,000 in
the entrepreneur category, and to $250,000 in the investment category, amounts which
approximate those in the Canadian immigrant investor program).
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full-time jobs (e.g., five), regardless of the invested amountY6 To sat-
isfy the element of commitment for continuous contribution, a treaty
investor must maintain E-2 status in the United States for a certain
number of years (e.g., two).2 7
This suggested option for adjustment of status for treaty investors
would remedy the inadequacy and the failure of the immigrant investor
program. 8 The adjustment of status provision would provide a mecha-
nism for converting status to permanent residency for the many treaty
investors who obtained E-2 status prior to the enactment of the immi-
grant investor visa, and who currently satisfy the immigrant investor
criteria. 9 Furthermore, the option of adjustment of status would retain
many treaty investors who would otherwise be forced to terminate their
investments and move back to their home countries because their spouse
or children became ineligible for derivative E-2 status in the United
States.2
256. See id. (stating that this test appears lenient when compared to current eligi-
bility criteria, which requires both parts of the test with higher thresholds). It would
be illogical, however, to impose stricter requirements on the treaty investors for ob-
taining permanent residency when they could reside in the United States indefinitely
for a small investment of $50,000, depending on the nature of the business and the
number of jobs it creates. Id.
257. Lee, supra note 246, at 151 (claiming that the current immigrant investor
program conditions permanent residency status for two years in order to "deter immi-
gration-related entrepreneurship fraud"); INA § 216A, 8 U.S.C. § 1186b (1988 &
Supp. IV (1992)).
258. See supra notes 248-251 and accompanying text (discussing the possible
causes for the failure of the immigrant investor program).
259. See Fertik, supra note 1, at 662 (claiming that a remaining flaw with the
program is the misapplication of the current immigrant investor program to E
visaholders who satisfy its requirements but remain ineligible because they invested
prior to its enactment).
260. See William J. Flynn III & Richard A. Jacobson, Foreign Investors: Imnigra-
tion and Nonimmigration Considerations, FLA. Bus. J., May 1992, at 68, 70
(discussing the problems associated with the children of treaty investors); Yanni, supra
note 1, at 9 (stating that problems often arise for children who reach 21 years of age
and must depart from the United States if change or status adjustment proves impos-
sible). The grown child will often have difficulty becoming adjusted to the way of
life abroad. Id. Moreover, he or she may have difficulty finding a suitable career,
having resided in the United States under derivative E-2 status for a number of years.
Id.
Because the Visa Office does not consider the trust between a treaty parent
and his or her child as an "essential skill," grown children rarely qualify as essential
treaty employees. Yanni, supra note 1, at 10. Although special family relationships
may explain executive and supervisory positions, most children fail to qualify as co-
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In this author's opinion, because treaty investors bring tremendous
benefits to the United States economy,"' the United States would ben-
efit if the treaty investors, who have proven their capability and commit-
ment to contribute to the United States economy, are allowed to reside
in the United States permanently, thereby guaranteeing the continuation
of their investments. American investors abroad would also receive
advantages because the treaty countries may grant them beneficial status
in light of this new residency provision. M
CONCLUSION
The stringent requirements of the proposed regulations on E-2 classifi-
cation will close the American door to many well-qualified foreign
investors whose investments would substantially benefit the United
States, and will hinder United States economic expansion abroad.
If the United States wants to compete with other nations to attract
foreign investment that generates revenue and jobs, and at the same time
encourage and protect United States investors abroad, it should maintain
the flexible approach and refrain from imposing unnecessary costs and
inconveniences upon treaty investors. Therefore, the proposed regulations
which impose such burdens ought to be changed to reflect these ultimate
goals. The creation of the option to adjust status will help achieve these
goals and will serve as one of the solutions to the failure of the immi-
grant investor program.
investors with their parents. Id.; Flynn & Jacobson, supra, at 70. Without having a
relative who has either United States citizenship or a permanent residency status, a
former derivative E-2 visaholder has little opportunity to obtain a green card. Id.
261. See Interview with Cornelius D. Scully and H. Edward Odom, supra note 11
(stating that the treaty investors, whether individual or corporate, have made "very
significant and major contributions to the local employment and to the United States
economy").
262. See supra note 203 and accompanying text (recognizing that in response to
the United States action on E-2 requirements, treaty nations may take reciprocal ac-
tion on their E-2 requirements).
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